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Abstract
This thesis models frictions that occur in payments and clearing activities
and analyzes how payments and clearing arrangements, technologies, and
regulatory policies reduce or eliminate such frictions and thus contribute to
financial inclusion and financial stability.
The first paper is a theoretical and empirical investigation into the trade-offs
between financial inclusion, tax revenues, and the rate of inflation and how
this trade-off changes with technologies providing cheaper access to payment
services. The second paper theoretically analyses the incentives of a central
counterparty and their surviving clearing agents during an auction of the
positions of a defaulted clearing agent. The third paper studies how bilateral
and central clearing arrangements deal with the moral hazard problem in
markets where agents are inclined to promise excessively high contingent
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Payments and clearing arrangements support a wide range of economic ac-
tivity. Payments, the transfer of a monetary claim e.g. in the form of cash or
deposit balances, typically forms one side of an exchange between two par-
ties. Clearing, the process of transmitting, reconciling, netting, and valuing
of transactions, is used in payment systems or derivatives markets to manage
counterparty risks. Common to both activities is their role in helping to re-
duce or overcome frictions of everyday economic activities and thereby play
a crucial role in a wide range of both microeconomic and macroeconomic
policy issues.
Against this background, I model in three essays how payments and clearing
arrangements, related technologies, and regulatory policies address frictions
such as information asymmetry or access costs and thus contribute to finan-
cial inclusion and financial stability. I analyze these issues using theoretical
models based on microeconomic theory and in one instance, where data is
available, I test the model predictions using panel data.
In the first paper, Financial Inclusion, Technology and the Impact on Mon-
etary and Fiscal Policy: Theory and Evidence, the frictions considered are
costly access to payment services and the inability of governments to tax
transactions paid in cash. Such frictions lead to low levels of financial in-
clusion, low government tax revenues and high inflation. I use a standard
monetary model with banks and introduce technologies that allow for more
affordable access to payment services (e.g. FinTech or mobile phone compa-
nies) and better monitoring of cash transactions for tax purposes and analyze
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the effect on financial inclusion, tax revenues and the welfare maximizing rate
of inflation. I show theoretically that economies with inefficient technologies
not only exhibit low levels of financial inclusion and tax revenues but that it
is welfare improving to use inflation tax as an additional source of tax rev-
enue. Improvements in technology lead to higher levels of financial inclusion,
more tax revenues and lower optimal rate of inflation. I test this prediction
using panel data for a broad set of countries. The data show a strong and
robust negative link between financial inclusion and inflation and a positive
link between financial inclusion and tax revenues.
In the second paper, Central Counterparty Auctions and Loss Allocation,
the main friction is that agents bear different private costs of holding risky,
non-tradeable assets. This forms the basis for trading swaps, which are sub-
sequently cleared by central counterparties and sets the stage for auctions
that central counterparties conduct when an agent defaults. Central coun-
terparties typically have sweeping powers in the form of recovery measures
to allocate losses to surviving agents. I discuss the optimal loss allocation
and show that central counterparties can increase the expected revenue of
the auction but that the size of the loss for the financial system as a whole is
not affected by the loss allocation. I show that while recovery measures do
increase the safety and soundness of central counterparties, they may incen-
tivize the central counterparty to delay of the auction, increasing the private
costs for surviving agents.
Finally, in the third paper, Markets in the Presence of Moral Hazard, Lim-
ited Liability and Nonexclusive Contracts, the friction is that agents might
find it profitable to trade too many contracts, exert low levels of effort and
subsequently default. I show that in case of bilateral clearing, collateral
solves this moral hazard problem. However, due to positive externalities,
agents often prefer not to collateralize contracts. I discuss the contribution
of contractual innovations (e.g. termination clauses) in solving the moral haz-
ard problem and show their limitations. Alternatively, central counterparty
clearing deals with this moral hazard problem by setting positions limits and
offering default-free contracts for low levels of collateral. However, this does
not work when several central counterparties clear the same market. I argue
that regulatory rules on minimum level of collateral are the most robust and
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In economies with a low level of financial inclusion (FI), most activities are
settled in cash and are thus more difficult to trace, record, and tax. I show the-
oretically that economies with inefficient financial technologies exhibit low levels
of FI and of tax revenue and that using an inflation tax as an additional source
of income improves welfare. Improvements in technology lead to a higher level of
FI, increased tax revenue and lower (optimal) inflation. I test this prediction using
panel data from a broad set of countries. The data show a strong and robust nega-
tive link between FI and inflation and a positive link between FI and tax revenue.
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1 Introduction
The level of financial inclusion1 has increased considerably in the last few years,
supported by public and private initiatives. According to the Global Financial
Inclusion Database2, between 2011 and 2017, the global share of adults with an
account at a financial institution rose from 51 to 69 percent.3 In India, for exam-
ple, the share of adults with an account more than doubled during the same time
period to 80 percent. According to Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018) an important
driving factor was government-issued biometric identification cards, lowering the
cost of access and boosting account ownership among unbanked adults. D’Silva
et al. (2019) provide a detailed case study of how India’s provision of digital finan-
cial infrastructure contributed to financial inclusion.
More generally, new applications of technology to financial services and to tax
collection have accelerated in the last few years with implications for how financial
services are provided, accessed and used and how effectively taxes are collected.
CPMI-IOSCO (2020) provides a recent account of the opportunities and risks in
fintech developments for financial inclusion.4 The report stresses that to harness
this technology, the government needs to provide financial and ICT infrastructure,
legal and regulatory frameworks and collaborate with the private sector. Simi-
lar approaches are advocated to increase the effectiveness of tax collection by, for
example, enhancing the ability of tax authorities to detect economic activity in
the informal sector (see, for example, Bird and Zolt (2008)). Countries that suc-
cessfully provide the foundations for harnessing new technologies are in a good
position to improve both financial inclusion and tax collection.
The growth in account ownership has not been uniform across countries. The
share of adults with a transaction account at a financial institution in a coun-
try can vary from slightly above zero to 100 percent. Economies with low levels
1Financial inclusion generally means that individuals and businesses have access to useful
and affordable financial products and services that meet their needs—for transactions, pay-
ments, savings, credit and insurance—delivered in a responsible and sustainable way. See
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview
2https://globalfindex.worldbank.org
3Individuals with an account can make and receive cashless payments or store value.
4These range from application programming interfaces, big data analytics, cloud computing,
contactless technology, digital identification for distributed ledger technologies and the Internet
of Things leading to new products and services.
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of financial inclusion settle most economic activities in cash, which implies that
these activities are more difficult to trace, record, and tax. Accordingly, in order
to finance public spending, governments often need to resort to other sources of
funding. For economies that rely heavily on cash, governments use the inflation
tax (or seigniorage taxation) as an additional source of income.
Figure 1, which plots the share of adults with an account at a financial institution
against inflation and tax revenue (as a percent of GDP), supports this claim: the
two panels show a negative correlation between financial inclusion and inflation
and a positive correlation between tax income and financial inclusion.5 What does
the literature have to say about this?
Given the amount of attention financial inclusion has received in the last decade,
there are surprisingly few studies that explore, either theoretically or empirically,
whether governments adjust inflation and taxation to the level of financial inclu-
sion. Several studies consider the somewhat related impact of the shadow economy
on tax revenue and inflation either from a theoretical point of view (for example,
Koreshkova (2006) or Nicolini (1998)) or use estimates to predict the impact of
the shadow economy on taxes and inflation (Mazhar and Meon (2017)). In addi-
tion, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show in a theoretical model that financial
repression is associated with high levels of tax evasion, low growth, and high infla-
tion and Levine (1997) discusses more generally the relationship between financial
development and economic growth. To my knowledge, only Oz-Yalaman (2019) as-
sesses the impact of financial inclusion on tax revenue and finds a significant and
positive relationship between financial inclusion and tax revenue. A theoretical
and empirical approach to financial inclusion and both tax revenue and inflation
is still missing.
In this paper, I aim to fill this void by analyzing the relationship between financial
inclusion, tax revenue, and inflation theoretically as well as empirically and setting
it in a broader technological context. Building on Lahcen and Pedro (2019), the
theoretical monetary model allows households to decide endogenously whether to
join the financial system or not, i.e., where financial inclusion is an equilibrium
5Of course, the figure does not reflect many other factors that affect tax revenue and inflation,
e.g., differences in institutional quality. This will be controlled for in the empirical portion of
the paper.
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Figure 1: Financial Inclusion (share of adults with an account at a financial in-
stitution), Inflation (Consumer Price Index), and Tax Revenue (as a % of GDP),
2011, 2014, 2017
outcome. Inflation, taxes, interest rates on deposits, the cost of handling cash,
the technology in the financial system (modeled as the utility cost of joining the
financial system) and the technology for tax collection are important determinants
of the equilibrium. I show that it is optimal for the government to set an inflation
rate above zero (which is consistent with the findings of Koreshkova (2006) and
Nicolini (1998)) and that more efficient technologies help to increase the level of
financial inclusion, and simultaneously lead to a decrease in the optimal level of
inflation and an increase in tax revenue. It is worth noting that such an outcome is
not self-evident: an increase in inflation raises the cost of holding cash and should
lead to an increase in financial inclusion, i.e., financial inclusion should increase
with inflation. The model predicts the opposite, which sets the stage for the em-
pirical analysis.
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Estimating these effects empirically is challenging because technological progress
in the financial system and in tax collection is difficult to observe and other pol-
icy variables such as inflation and taxes are set at the same time, together with
financial inclusion. For the empirical analysis, I exploit the fact that recent tech-
nological innovations have swiftly improved access to financial services by offering
better and cheaper services. For example, the entry of FinTech and mobile phone
companies offering payment services—and increasingly saving, credit, and insur-
ance services—has been swift in several countries and its potential to accelerate
financial inclusion is well recognized (see, for example, Bech and Hancock (2020),
Philippon (2020)). According to Frost et al. (2019) the success of these new pay-
ment service providers seems to rely on the use of technology to offer cheaper ser-
vices, the ability to reach a wide audience through existing platforms and thereby
reaping network effects, and the ability to process and analyze data to improve
services and benefit customers even further.
In line with my hypothesis, I find a significant and robust negative relationship
between financial inclusion and inflation and a positive relationship between fi-
nancial inclusion and tax revenue, even after controlling for major macroeconomic
variables. The relationship between inflation and financial inclusion holds even
when controlling for the independence of central banks but disappears for devel-
oped countries. The relationship between taxation and financial inclusion is more
robust and holds for all specifications.
Related Literature
This paper builds on several strands of literature. First, the monetary model is
based on Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005), who intro-
duce an environment where currency is essential by facilitating the exchange of
goods. Many subsequent papers have expanded this core model by introducing
additional features (see Lagos et al. (2017) for an overview). Most relevant to
this paper, Berentsen and Waller (2007) introduced the banking sector into the
standard monetary model. This paper borrows many features from Williamson
(2012), who explicitly models an environment in which agents pay in currency or
with interest-earning bank deposits. This feature is crucial because agents who
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join banks can avoid the use of cash and the affiliated costs of inflation.
Second, this paper relates to the vast literature that studies the shadow or under-
ground economy.6 One of the recurring findings in this literature is that shadow
economy activities are found in all economies but that their size varies considerably
(see Schneider and Enste (2000) for an extensive review of this literature). Some
of the papers that seek to explain these variations are based on the centuries-old
notion that inflation, or more generally, debasing the value of money, can be used
to finance government expenditure (see, for example, Sussman (1993) for an ac-
count of France’s debasement of coinage to increase revenue during the Hundred
Years’ War in the 15th century). For example, Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014)
use a monetary model in the tradition of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) in which
agents can choose to use cash to pay for goods and avoid taxes or to use readily
available credit but be charged with taxes. Since inflation increases the cost of
holding cash, it provides incentives to pay with credit and thus reduces the size
of the non-taxed or shadow economy; i.e., they establish that there is a negative
relation between inflation and the size of the shadow economy. Nicolini (1998) and
Koreshkova (2006) take the public finance perspective and argue that it might be
welfare improving to use inflation to extract tax revenue when an economy is faced
with a large informal sector. Nicolini (1998) takes the size of the informal economy
as given in contrast to Koreshkova (2006), where the size of the formal and infor-
mal sectors is driven by the productivity gap between the two producing sectors.
The financial sector in Koreshkova (2006) offers protection from inflation but does
not help the government collect taxes. Thus, a more productive banking sector
increases the size of the informal sector and the level of optimal inflation. Finally,
Aruoba (2018) explains cross-country differences in inflation, tax revenue and the
size of the informal sector through the institutional factors of a country, modeled
as the difficulty of tax evasion.7 This paper differs from this literature in several
ways. In Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014), the financial system is fully developed
and efficiently operated; thus, technological changes, unlike in the present paper,
6Schneider and Enste (2000) defines the shadow economy as either all legal economic activities
that avoid taxation or all illegal activities that avoid regulation or laws.
7Similarly, Ihrig and Moe (2004) and Prado (2011) seek to explain the differences in the size
of the informal sector based on taxation and tax enforcement without considering inflation as a
main driving force.
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do not play a role. In Koreshkova (2006), the financial system helps agents avoid
the cost of inflation, but the financial system does not support the government
in collecting taxes. Thus, relative improvements in the efficiency of the financial
system reduce tax evasion and lead to a higher level of optimal inflation. This con-
trasts with the role of the financial sector in this paper, in which improvements in
technology (and thus efficiency) increase financial inclusion and tax revenues but
decrease (optimal) inflation. In the empirical analysis, I show that as predicted by
the model, there is indeed a negative relationship between financial inclusion and
inflation and a positive relationship between financial inclusion and tax revenue.
Third, I model public finance trade-offs in an environment with endogenous finan-
cial inclusion and follow the tradition of Chatterjee and Corbae (1992), Franklin Allen
(1994) and others who show that endogenous decisions to join financial markets
have potentially rich implications for macroeconomic behavior. Lahcen and Pedro
(2019) study the effects of endogenous financial inclusion on inequality and find
that in such a setting, monetary policy has distributional consequences. In this
paper, I find similar rich and contrasting macroeconomic trade-offs.
2 The Model
2.1 Private Economic Agents
Following Lagos and Wright (2005) and Rocheteau and Wright (2005), at each
date t = 0, 1, ..., agents convene sequentially in a decentralized market (DM) and
a centralized market (CM). In the DM, some agents, called sellers, provide a good
that is demanded by other agents, called buyers. In the CM, both buyers and sellers
meet in a centralized Walrasian market and make production and consumption
decisions. Let there be a continuum of sellers and buyers, each with mass one.
The period utility for buyers and sellers is given by
U(h, q) = −h+ u(q) and Ũ(x,H) = x−H
where the pair 〈h, x〉 represents labor and consumption in the CM, and 〈q,H〉
is consumption and labor in the DM. The utility of the buyer in the DM u(·) is
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twice continuously differentiable so that some q̂ > 0 exists, such that u(q̂)− q̂ = 0.
Define q∗ by u′(q∗) = 1 and define the utility function as having constant relative
risk aversion, or −xu′′(x)
u′(x) = 1. The production technology available to buyers and
sellers allows the production of one unit of the perishable consumption goods q
and x, respectively, for each unit of labor supply, which hinders the barter between
agents across the CM and DM. I also assume that agents are anonymous in the
DM, which hinders unsecured credit. These two frictions (perishable goods and
anonymity) generate a role for assets in the facilitation of exchange.
There are two assets that can serve in this capacity: currency, with supply M and
ownership claims on a financial intermediary promising to pay q+1 units of currency
in the next period with supply A. If the financial intermediary is a bank, then
the claim is also referred to as a deposit. In this paper, I use the terms bank and
deposits, which include any other financial entity, including Fintech and Big Tech
companies. Given that φ is the CM price of money in terms of the consumption
good x, then the real value of currency and deposits is m = φM and a = φA.
All agents can hold and receive currency, but to hold and receive deposits, agents
need to join a bank; i.e., agents cannot hold government bonds directly.
In the CM, all sellers, buyers, and the government meet in a centralized Walrasian
market, where production and consumption decisions are made and where buyers
decide whether to join a bank and deposit their savings at that bank. Given that
a fixed exogenous fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1] of sellers have a bank account (accepting cash
as well as deposits as payment), an endogenous fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of buyers decide
to join a bank. A buyer’s decision about whether to join a bank is affected by the
following factors: the cost of opening a bank account ω, the cost of handling cash
c, inflation µ, and tax payment τ , which will be discussed in detail in section 3.
Finally, in the DM, each buyer is matched at random with a seller. In cases
where both the buyer and seller have joined a bank, a communication technology
is available that permits the buyer to transfer ownership of a claim on the bank
to the seller. Following Williamson (2012), I refer to these as monitored meetings.
In all other cases, nonmonitored meetings occur, in which only currency issued
by the government can be used to pay for the exchange of goods. Finally, let us
assume that, when a buyer meets a seller, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer of assets in exchange for goods.
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2.2 Technology
In addition to the factors mentioned above, technology affects γ, the share of
financially included buyers, in two ways. First, ω reflects the cost of accessing and
using a bank account for making payments. Assuming that the banking sector
is competitive and that the cost of providing a bank account is zero, ω can be
interpreted as the utility cost to the buyer of opening and accessing a bank account
to make payments. Thus, ω is agent specific and permanent. I assume that this
utility cost is uniformly distributed across buyers, ω ∼ U [0, k], where k ∈ [0, 1]
represents the technology in the financial sector: the lower k is, the more efficient
the financial sector is.
Second, a buyer’s transactions are easier to trace, record, and tax if he or she
has joined a bank. Therefore, a buyer who has joined a bank pays the full tax τ ,
whereas a buyer who has not joined a bank pays only (1−θ)τ , where (1−θ) ∈ [0, 1]
represents the likelihood of being caught. Improvements in the technology of the
taxation system help increase the likelihood of being caught, i.e., the level of
enforcement. This is similar to Ihrig and Moe (2004), who model the level of
enforcement as the probability of being caught and then having to pay taxes or,
alternatively, having to pay an additional penalty. They note that the level of
enforcement is difficult to measure and use the inverse of seigniorage as a proxy.
Unlike Ihrig and Moe (2004), who assume the relationship between seigniorage
and enforcement, I aim to establish this relationship by arguing that technology
plays an important role.
Finally, I assume that the two types of technology are closely intertwined and
move in the same direction, which means that technological improvements reduce
the cost of access to the financial system and support better tax enforcement; i.e.,
technological improvements lower the parameters k and θ.
2.3 Government
The government is a consolidated entity, consisting of a fiscal and a monetary
authority. The government can levy lump-sum taxes on financially included buyers
in the CM, with τ denoting the tax per buyer in units of goods used to finance real
government spending G. In addition, the government issues M units of currency
8
and B one-period nominal bonds held by the banks. The bonds issued by the
government have a payoff of q+1 in the next period as measured in units of money.
Letting φ denote the price of money in terms of goods in the CM market, the
consolidated government budget constraint is
φ(M +B) + γτ + (1− θ)(1− γ)τ = φ(M−1 + qB−1) +G (1)
Equation (1) states that the government’s outstanding liabilities at the end of the
CM, plus tax revenue, must equal the government’s net outstanding liabilities at
the beginning of the CM, for all periods.
To limit the class of monetary policies, I follow Williamson (2012) and fix two
parameters: first, the total stock of government liabilities grows at a constant
rate µ, and the ratio of currency to total government debt is a constant δ, i.e.,
M = δ(M +B). Since I consider only cases where the government is a net debtor
(B > 0), it follows that δ ∈ [0, 1).














(q − 1) +G
]
(2)
In equation (2), the first term in front of the square bracket expresses the scope
of buyers covered by the tax; i.e., more buyers joining the financial system γ or
improvements in the tax technology θ lower the lump sum tax. The first term
in the square bracket expresses the negative of the proceeds from the increase in
currency, i.e., higher proceeds decrease the lump sum taxes. The second term in
the square bracket is the real value of the net interest on government liabilities,
which needs to be financed by the lump sum tax. Finally, the last term represents
the to-be-financed real government spending.
2.4 Banks
Banks form in the CM before buyers know whether they will meet a financially
included or excluded seller in the DM, and dissolve in the CM of the subsequent
period, when they are replaced by new banks.
Banks can invest deposits into government-issued bonds or into currency. Since I
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assume that the banking system is competitive, the gross real interest rate paid
on the deposits equals the gross real interest rate r+1 of the government bonds,




When a financially included buyer meets a financially included seller, then she
can pay with her interest-bearing deposits. However, if she meets a financially
excluded seller, she would need to withdraw cash and forego the interest on the
deposit. Following Williamson (2012), banks offer a deposit contract that max-
imizes the expected utility of each of its depositors by offering interest rates on
deposits and minimizing the amount of cash that must be put aside to pay for
transactions with financially excluded sellers. Based on this optimal offer, buyers
decide whether to join the bank (and make deposits in the form of goods).
3 Equilibrium
In this section I define and characterize the equilibrium.
3.1 Financially Excluded Buyers
The CM and DM value functions are denoted by W (me) and V (me), where me
refers to the currency that will be used by the financially excluded buyers in real
terms. The CM problem is
W (me) = max
m̂e,h
−h+ βV̂ (m̂e), s.t. h = µm̂e −me + c+ (1− θ)τ
where m̂e is the real value of money taken out of the CM and put into the DM in
the next period, and c is the cost of handling cash, which represents the cost of
theft protection, the inconvenience of handling banknotes and coins, etc. The first-
order condition (FOC) is βV̂ ′(m̂e) = µ and the envelope condition W ′(me) = 1
demonstrates that W (me) is linear.
Let qe denote the exchanged good and pe the respective payment in a nonmonitored
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meeting in the DM. Then, the value function in the DM can be written as:
V̂ (m̂e) = Ŵ (m̂e − pe) + u(qe), s.t. pe ≤ m̂e (3)
Since in the baseline model, we are considering take-it-or-leave-it offers, the buyer
will offer the seller enough currency to cover her costs; i.e., to get qe, the buyer
offers to pay pe = m̂e = qe.
As usual, β
µ
< 1 implies that buyers spend all their currency when they meet a
seller in the DM, i.e., that they are constrained in a meeting and that me = 0. In
the case where β
µ
= 1, the buyer can consume the optimal amount of goods q∗ and
is indifferent to carrying currency into the CM or not (i.e., me ≥ 0). Differentiating





Since qe = m̂e, it follows that qe < q
∗ when µ
β
> 1. The discounted utility of the
financially excluded buyer in the CM expressed in terms of real goods is then
Ve = Le − c− (1− θ)τ, where Le = −µqe + βu(qe) (5)
The first term represents the net utility of the financially excluded buyer: to buy
qe goods in the DM next period, the buyer needs to acquire m̂e = µqe money in
real terms in the CM.
3.2 Financially Included Buyers
For each buyer, the bank acquires mn units of currency (to be spent in a nonmon-
itored meeting) and a units of interest-bearing assets. Since a fraction of buyers
γ join a bank, all banks together acquire γmn units of currency and γa units of
interest-bearing assets.
When buyer-depositors learn their types, at the end of the CM, each depositor who
will be in a nonmonitored meeting in the DM withdraws m
′
n
1−ρ units of currency.






units of the bank’s original assets.8 The CM problem for
a buyer is
W (a) = max
m̂n,â,h
−h+ βV̂ (m̂n, â), s.t. aq + h = µ(m̂n + â) + τ + (1− ρ)c+ ω (6)
It is optimal for the financially included buyer to spend all currency in the DM.
Therefore, the agent will only take deposit claims a into the CM. The key FOCs
are βV̂1(m̂n, â) = βV̂2(m̂n, â) = µ and the EC is W
′(a) = q. The DM problem can
be stated as follows:
V̂ (â, m̂n) = (1− ρ)un(qn) + ρum(qm) + Ŵ (â′) (7)
where qn =
m̂′n








Naturally, qn represents the exchanged good in a nonmonitored meeting where
currency was used, and qm is the quantity of exchanged goods in a monitored
meeting against bank-deposits. Substituting (7) into (6), and expressing m and a















The FOCs are as follows, where qn =
m′n















a − 1 = 0 (9c)
uma′ − 1 = 0 (9d)
An equilibrium in which real bonds are plentiful requires that βr+1 = 1, in which




a′ , according to (9d), the bank is
willing to acquire any amount of additional real bonds a′ that are available in the
market. Buying more bonds than necessary for the exchange (i.e., a′ > a) does
8It is natural to assume that buyers spend all currency in the DM, since we look at equilibria
where φ+1φ β ≤ 1.
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not affect the utility of the agent.
With regard to the currency acquired by the bank, which is based on (9a) ummn < u
m
a
as long as µ > β, and so mn = m
′




. If µ = β, the bank acquires any currency that is issued by the
government without affecting the utility of the agent.
Finally, the expected utility of a financially included buyer in each period is then
Vi(ω) = (1− ρ)Ln + ρLm − (ω + (1− ρ)c+ τ) (10)
where Ln = −µqn + βun(qn) and Lm = − 1r+1 qm + βu
m(qm). The first and second
parts sum up the net utility in the case of a nonmonitored and a monitored meeting,
respectively. The third part contains the expected costs after joining a bank ω +
(1− ρ)c and the tax payment τ .
A buyer will join the financial system if Vi(ω) ≥ Ve. The share of buyers joining
the financial system can be defined as γ = ω̃
k
where Vi(ω̃) = Ve.
3.3 Characterization
I confine attention to stationary monetary equilibria where real quantities are
constant over time, i.e., m = φM = φ−1M−1 and b = φB = φ−1B−1. This implies
that µ = φ−1
φ
and the nominal gross interest rate can be expressed as q = µr.
Further, I assume that the supply of government bonds is plentiful so that, as will
be shown later, the gross real interest rate is r = 1
β
.
Definition 1 Given monetary policy µ, δ and share ρ of sellers joining banks,
an equilibrium consists of real quantities of currency m = γmn + (1 − γ)me and
plentiful amount of real bonds b ≥ γa (to be defined below) with a gross real interest
rate r = 1
β
, such that (i) mn and a solve (8) and me solve (4), (ii) the tax rate is
defined (based on equation (2)) as
τ =
γmn + (1− γ)me
γ + (1− θ)(1− γ)








γ + (1− θ)(1− γ) (11)
and (iii) the share γ of buyers joining a bank is defined as γ = ω̃
k
where Vi(ω̃) = Ve.
As discussed in Williamson (2012), there are four possible equilibria: i) liquidity
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trap, ii) plentiful interest-bearing assets, iii) scarce interest-bearing assets, and iv)
the Friedman rule. Equilibria i) and iii) require that interest-bearing assets are
scarce, equilibrium ii) requires that their supply is plentiful, and equilibrium vi)
is possible in a scarce or plentiful environment. Since I define the interest-bearing
assets to be plentiful, I reduce the possible solutions to equilibria ii) and iv), which
are characterized and discussed in the following.
3.3.1 Plentiful Interest-Bearing Assets Case
In this equilibrium, 1
µ
< r = 1
β
, which means that the nominal interest rate
on interest bearing assets is positive and that currency is comparably scarce.
Therefore, based on the first-order condition for problem (8), we have m′n = mn,











which allows us to make two observations. First, in nonmonitored meetings, ex-
change is not efficient and leads to the same size of goods exchanges as in the case of
the financially excluded buyer, i.e., qn = qe = q, which implies that mn = (1−ρ)me.
Second, the assumption that −xu′′(x)
u′(x) = 1 implies that the demand for currency
mb is independent of µ.
Since the rate of return on interest-bearing assets is equal to the rate of time pref-
erence, exchange is efficient in monitored meetings (all buyers receive q∗ in the
DM), and the bank is willing to acquire an unlimited quantity of interest-bearing
assets. For the interest-bearing assets to be plentiful, we require that the supply
of real bonds b is above the threshold b ≥ βγρq∗.




(L∗ − L+ c)− θ
k
τ (13)
9For certain parameters the implicit function, (13) has two possible solutions for γ1,2 ∈ (0, 1).
I consider only the solution leading to a higher level of financial inclusion, since the lower solution
has no meaningful economic interpretation. For example, better technology would lead to a lower
level of financial inclusion.
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Figure 2: Drivers of Financial Inclusion
(a) Inflation and financial inclusion (b) Technology and financial inclusion
The utility u(x) = log(x) and parameters displayed in table (1) are used. In addition,
for the right-hand figure, an inflation rate of µ = 1.1 is applied, and for the left-hand
figure, the technology parameters k = θ = 0.2 are applied.













γ + (1− θ)(1− γ) (14)
Clearly, joining the financial system is more attractive when the share of sellers in
the financial system ρ and the cost of handling cash c are high.
The effects of inflation µ and technology k as well as of θ are not straightforward
because they also affect the level of taxes τ . Generally, an increase in µ boosts
the level of financially included buyers γ. Similarly, a reduction in k and θ, e.g.
through a cost-cutting technology allowing cheaper access to banks and better
collection of taxes from the financially excluded, increases financial inclusion, as
displayed in Figure (2). With growing financial inclusion, the threshold b at which
interest-bearing assets are plentiful also increases.
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3.3.2 Friedman Rule Case
If 1
µ
= r = 1
β
, then mn > (1 − ρ)q∗, m′n = (1 − ρ)q∗, a′ = a + mn − q∗, and
a+mb ≥ q∗.
In this case, all rates of return are equal to the rate of time preference, µ = β, and
the equilibrium exists for any number of real bonds b. Only buyers who have a








Note that the financially included would need to finance not only government
spending but also the reduction in the money base. Therefore, for a certain set of
parameters, there is no solution; i.e., no one joins the financial system.
3.4 Welfare Analysis
I weight the utilities of buyers and sellers equally. In this case, the sellers drop
out (zero net benefit), and welfare can be measured as the sum of the utility of








When comparing the plentiful interest-bearing equilibrium with the Friedman rule
equilibrium, the trade-off between the level of consumption and the cost of handling
cash must be considered. While the Friedman rule allows all agents to consume
the same (optimal) level of goods in the DM, it is associated with a low level of
financial inclusion, leading to high costs for handling cash and higher taxes for
those who join the financial system. The plentiful interest-bearing equilibrium
leads to a sub-optimal level of consumption among the financially excluded (and
the nonmonitored meetings of the included) and thus to higher levels of inequality,
but it induces higher levels of financial inclusion and thus lower costs for handling
cash. This raises the question of whether welfare can be improved by introducing
a wedge between the rate of inflation and real interest rates, inducing more buyers
to join the banking system.
16
Figure 3: Welfare, seignorage and taxes
(a) Welfare and Utility (b) Seignorage and taxes
The utility u(x) = log(x) and parameters displayed in table (1) are used. In addition, the
technology parameters k = θ = 0.2 are applied. Seignorage is defined as the government
income gained from increasing the money base, which must equal spending net of tax
income, i.e., φ(M −M−1) = G+ φ(B − qB−1)− (1− θ(1− γ))τ .
Before analyzing the optimal welfare-maximizing inflation rate, it is worth dis-
cussing the externalities surrounding the decision of an agent to join the financial
system. When a buyer decides whether to join the financial system, she does not
consider the consequences this has on the tax rate that the other buyers need to
pay. For example, if at a certain tax level, a buyer decides not to join, this might
increase the tax rate and induce more buyers to not join the financial system.
In an extreme case, the ”official” tax rate becomes very high so that no agent
joins the financial system, and all suffer the costs of holding cash but pay only
a share of the official tax rate. In this case, the government can raise inflation,
thus making joining the financial system more attractive through three avenues:
1) the cost of staying out of the financial system increases, 2) the official tax rate
decreases because the tax base widens, and 3) a lower share of government revenue
is financed through taxation, reducing the tax base further. This has implications
for the utility of the financially included and excluded and for aggregate welfare,
as shown in Figure (3).
I show in the following that it is optimal to have positive inflation. In the case of
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the plentiful asset-bearing equilibrium, inserting the utilities Vi(x) and Ve, welfare





(1− ρ)L+ ρL∗ − (x+ (1− ρ)c+ τ)
)1
k
dx+ (1− γ)(L − c− (1− θ)τ)
= γ
(




kγ2 + (1− γ)(L − c− (1− θ)τ)

















The economic interpretation of equation (15) is that the first term represents the
net welfare gain among the financially included, for whom welfare increases due
to higher inflation (since ∂τ
∂µ
< 0), but the welfare from non-monitored meetings is
lower. Note that the net benefit increases with ρ for the financially included.
The second term represents the welfare change for the financially excluded. On
the one hand, welfare is lower because the financially excluded carry less cash in
real terms and buy less in a DM meeting (since ∂L
∂µ
< 0); on the other hand, they
profit from the reduction in taxes as well (as long as θ < 1). The net benefit
decreases with θ for the financially excluded.






i.e., that it is optimal to have money growth that is higher than 1 and thus positive
inflation.
Since it is not possible to find an analytic solution to the first-order condition (15),
I provide a numerical analysis in the following section.
10The FOC can be alternatively written (noting that ∂γ∂µ =
q










(γ + (1− γ)(1− θ)) = 0
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4 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy and Fi-
nancial Inclusion
In this section, I discuss the optimal monetary and fiscal policies and the optimal
level of financial inclusion under different technology parameters 〈k, θ〉 which re-
flect the inefficiency in banking and tax collection. To do so, I consider specific
functional forms and parameter values. The utility of the buyer in the DM is
given by u(q) = ln(q). The parameter values are summarized in table (1). The
value for the discount rate β is set to the literature standard and G, the share
of government spending in the goods consumed is set equal to the average value
for central governments taken from the World Bank. The cost of using cash c is
difficult to estimate. The value 2 percent of income is based on Malte and Seitz
(2014), who provide an overview of these issues. The probability of meeting a fi-
nancially included seller ρ is set to be approximately equal to the average financial
inclusion of sellers and represents that of middle income countries. Finally, the
ratio of currency to government liability δ can vary considerably. The value chosen
ensures that the supply of bonds is abundant for all the relevant parameters k and
θ.
Table 1: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
β Discount factor .95
G Government spending (share of GDP) 0.2
c Cost of using cash (share of income) 0.02
ρ Prob. of meeting a financially included seller 0.5
δ Ratio of currency to gov. liability 0.5
F (ω) Distribution of costs to access a bank U ∼ [0, k], k ∈ (0, 1)
θ Inefficiency in tax collection θ ∈ (0, 1)
The optimal inflation, tax revenue, and financial inclusion for different levels of
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taxation and financial technology are displayed in figure (4). An improvement in
taxation technology θ (leaving financial technology k fixed) leads to higher levels
of financial inclusion, lower optimal inflation and higher tax revenue (see subfigure
(4a)). Improving the taxation technology raises the tax revenue obtained from the
financially excluded, which at the same time raises the attractiveness of joining
the financial system and reduces the optimal inflation tax.
An improvement in the financial technology k (leaving taxation technology θ fixed)
leads to a sharp increase in financial inclusion and tax revenue. Optimal inflation,
however, increases slightly too (see subfigure (4b)); i.e., in such a case, financial
inclusion and inflation are positively correlated. The reason is that with growing
financial inclusion, the tax base increases, as does the optimal individual tax τ ;
thus the financially excluded also profit from a decrease in taxation. Therefore it
is optimal to increase the inflation tax slightly.
Finally, if the financial and taxation technologies move jointly, then their improve-
ment leads to a rapid increase in financial inclusion and in tax revenue. Optimal
inflation also decreases sharply (see subfigure 4c).
Overall, in all three scenarios, technological improvements lead to higher finan-
cial inclusion and higher tax revenue; thus, both variables are always positively
correlated. The correlation between inflation and financial inclusion is negative,
whether taxation and financial technology move together or whether only taxation
improves. In the case of an improvement in financial technology only, the correla-
tion between financial inclusion and inflation is either positive or inconclusive. To
test the model, I empirically analyze the relationship between these variables in
the following sections.
5 Strategy for Empirical Analysis and Data
5.1 Model
In section 4, I have argued that tax revenue increases with financial inclusion and
that depending on the technological progress, inflation decreases with financial
inclusion. Therefore, regressing tax revenue and inflation on financial inclusion is
the natural choice. However, the empirical analysis is made more difficult through
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Figure 4: Taxes, inflation, and financial inclusion
(a) Taxation technology θ (k = 0.2 fixed) (b) Financial technology k (θ = 0.2 fixed)
(c) Technology θ = k
two issues. First, the observable variables inflation, taxes, and financial inclusion
〈µ, τ, θ〉 depend on the unobservable variables financial and taxation technology
〈k, ω〉 and are set at the same time, blurring cause and effect. Second, while 〈µ, τ〉
can be observed for many countries over a long period, good quality data on γ for
a broad range of countries are only available for the years 2011, 2014, and 2017,
limiting the availability of data.
The strategy for the empirical analysis is to control for a broad set of macroeco-
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nomic variables that are known in the literature to affect inflation and tax revenue
and to control for time and country-specific effects as well. More formally, I esti-
mate the following model
Γit = αγit + AX
′
it + ci + λt + ζit (16)
where the dependent variable Γit represents either inflation πit or aggregate tax
revenue Tit. γit measures financial inclusion (in terms of account ownership or in
terms of transaction value or volume), and X ′it is a set of control variables that
contains openness to international trade, government debt, the level of corruption,
GDP growth, and unemployment. α and A represent the marginal impact of a
change in financial inclusion or in the control variables on the dependent variables.
ci and λt represent country and year fixed effects, respectively. Finally, ζit is an
error term.
5.2 The Datasets
I draw from two sources for the data on financial inclusion: the World Bank’s
Global Financial Inclusion survey, which looks at financial inclusion from the de-
mand side, and the IMF’s Financial Access survey, which covers the supply side.
I describe each source in turn.
Since 2011, the Global Financial Inclusion Database has published a comprehen-
sive data set on how adults save, borrow, make payments, and manage risks glob-
ally every three years.11 The survey in 2017 covered 144 economies representing
more than 97% of the world’s population.12 I have removed economies with only
one observation or without at least two consecutive observations as well as all
19 economies that are part of the European Economic and Monetary Union be-
cause they do not control both their fiscal and monetary policies. For the years
2011, 2014, and 2017, the cleaned database contains 345 observations for 119
economies (thus, the panel data are not balanced due to missing observations for
some economies).
In this paper, I focus on the payment aspects of financial inclusion and use the
11https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/
12For more details on the survey methodology, see Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2018), p. 111 ff.
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variable FI, which measures the share of ownership of transaction accounts at a
financial institution, as the main measure of financial inclusion (see table (2) for a
set of descriptive statistics).13 I check the robustness of this approach by using two
different definitions of account ownership in the robustness section: FI+, which
contains account ownership at financial institutions and mobile money institutes,
and FI-, which measures usage of mobile money accounts only. The latter variable
is available only for the years 2014 and 2017.
The Financial Access Survey14 has been collecting data on the use of and access to
basic financial services worldwide since 2004 and has covered account ownership
and the usage of mobile money since 2007 in several countries (see IMF (2019) for
the latest report). Due to the way the data are collected, the account ownership
statistics are of limited value to this study because they include substantial double-
counting of account owners. However, the statistics on the value of mobile money
transactions (variable MTV), the number of mobile money transactions (variable
MTN), the and number of active mobile money accounts (variable MAU) are very
useful as a complement to my analysis (see table (3) for descriptive statistics).
5.3 Descriptive Statistics and Control Variables
Descriptive statistics of all dependent variables and control variables used in this
paper are displayed in tables (2) and (3). The dependent variables tax revenue
(Tax) and consumer price index (CPI) contain a fair share of variation across time
(see within variation), but most of the variation occurs between countries. This
statement also holds for most of the control variables.
Openness is defined as the ratio of imports and exports to GDP. There is no con-
sensus in the literature on the impact of openness to trade on inflation and taxes.
Romer (1993) argues that because openness increases the cost of inflation for
economies, central banks have an incentive to reduce inflation with openness and
provides empirical evidence in support of this claim. However, ample theoretical
13Financial institution accounts include those owned by respondents who report having an
account at a bank or at another type of financial institution, such as a credit union, a microfinance




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: World Bank Group Financial Inclusion Dataset
Variable Definition Panel Mean Sd Min Max Obs.
Tax a Tax revenue Overall 15.40 5.99 0.07 36.50 N = 238
(% of GDP) Between 6.08 0.25 34.21 n = 90
Within 1.03 11.46 19.41 T = 2.64
CPI a,e Consumer prices Overall 5.01 4.65 -
3.70
29.51 N = 328
(annual %) Between 4.28 -
1.01
26.09 n = 116
Within 2.64 -
2.02
17.97 T = 2.83
FI b Acc. ownership at Overall 0.48 0.30 0.02 1.00 N = 328
fin. institutions Between 0.29 0.05 1.00 n = 116
(% age 15+) Within 0.07 0.27 0.72 T = 2.832
FI+ b Fin. institutions Overall 0.49 0.29 0.02 1.00 N = 328
and mobile money Between 0.28 0.05 1.00 n = 116
(% age 15+) Within 0.08 0.26 0.73 T = 2.83
FI- b Mobile money Overall 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.73 N = 139
(% age 15+) Between 0.11 0.00 0.66 n = 76
Within 0.06 -
0.08
0.29 T = 1.83
Openness a Trade Overall 84.19 52.84 23.93 425.98 N = 326
(% of GDP) Between 51.37 24.25 408.07 n = 115
Within 8.43 48.71 123.63 T = 2.83
Debt a Central government Overall 46.17 30.61 0.06 236.07 N = 319
debt (% of GDP) Between 29.37 0.23 231.05 n = 113
Within 7.93 12.66 95.70 T = 2.82
COR c Corrpution Overall 41.92 18.18 8.00 92.00 N = 314
Perception Index Between 18.38 11.67 90.00 n = 111
Within 2.03 32.58 48.42 T = 2.83
∆ GDP a Yearly growth Overall 16.72 17.73 0.68 96.55 N = 328
GDP per capita Between 17.72 0.76 86.40 n = 116
Within 2.01 6.36 26.88 T = 2.83
UNP d Unemployment Overall 7.40 5.78 0.32 31.38 N = 325
(% of labor force) Between 5.70 0.44 27.26 n = 115
Within 1.15 2.32 11.81 T = 2.83
Source: a World Bank; b Global Findex Database, World Bank; c Transparency Interna-
tional; d International Labour Organization.e Countries with CPI ≥ 30% were removed
from the sample
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: IMF Financial Access Survey
Variable Definition Panel Mean Sd Min Max Obs.
MTV Value of mobile Overall 7.93 17.20 0 142.39 N = 394
money transactions Between 10.01 0 41.03 n = 68
(% of GDP) Within 12.76 -
33.1
119.84 T = 5.79
MTN Number of mobile Overall 7.25 15.99 0 195.97 N = 395
money transactions Between 8.45 0 39.06 n = 67
(per person) Within 12.78 -
31.8
164.17 T =5.90
MAU Number of active Overall 0
.15
0.20 0 0.94 N = 268
mobile money accounts Between 0.16 0 0.65 n = 50
(per person) Within 0.13 -
0.27
0.85 T =5.36
Source: IMF Financial Access Survey
and empirical papers have either supported or contradicted the negative relation
between openness and inflation (see Ghosh (2014) for a discussion). Gnangnon
and Brun (2019) noted that economies that have successfully reformed their tax
regimes generate higher tax revenues.
Central government debt (as a % of GDP), corruption, growth of GDP, and un-
employment (as a % of the workforce) are the other major macroeconomic and
institutional variables I control for.
6 Findings
Rapid and diverse changes in the level of financial inclusion in a relatively short
period of time allow for an estimation of equation (16) with a fixed effects model.15
The advantage of this approach is that the model controls for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity between countries and that the estimators (mainly financial
inclusion) can be endogenous with regard to the time-invariant heterogeneity with-
out affecting the validity of the results. The fixed-effects model has the advantage
15The Hausman test clearly rejects the null hypothesis that the random effects model is the
correct specification.
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of controlling for such slow-moving institutional arrangements.
Table (4) presents all regression results. Columns 1 and 3 show a fixed-effects
model with financial inclusion FI as the sole regressor. The log-transformed vari-
able FI takes into account the fact that a 10 percentage point increase in financial
inclusion in a country with a low level of basic inclusion is weighted higher than the
same increase in a country with a high level. The coefficient on financial inclusion
is positive (1.221) for tax revenues, negative (−4.057) for CPI and statistically
significant in both cases, consistent with my model. The interpretation is that a
doubling of the share of financially included adults in a country is associated with
an increase in tax revenue of roughly 1.2 percentage points relative to GDP and a
decrease in inflation of 4 percentage points.
Columns 2 and 4 show the same model with all control variables and country as
well as year fixed effects. The FI coefficient w.r.t. taxes in Column 2 does not
change much, while the coefficient in Column 4 decreases in magnitude (−2.291)
but remains statistically significant. Openness and GDP growth are statistically
significant for taxes (both positive) and government debt is significant in the CPI
regression. The coefficients on corruption and unemployment are not statistically
significant in either regression.
7 Robustness Checks
All results discussed in this section are summarized in tables (5) to (7).
7.1 Central Bank Independence
The theoretical model is based on implicit or explicit coordination between the
fiscal and monetary policies. With an independent central bank, this coordina-
tion might break down. More precisely, the marginal effect of financial inclusion
on inflation should be of lower magnitude (or not statistically significant) when
accounting for central bank independence.
I use the central bank independence index from Garriga (2016) and divide the
economies into two groups: independent central banks, which are at or above the
median index value, and non-independent central banks, which are below the me-
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Table 4: Estimation Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Tax Tax CPI CPI
FI (log) 1.221** 1.269** -4.057*** -2.291***











Constant 16.36*** 15.69*** 0.848 1.575
(0.406) (2.107) (0.671) (6.350)
Observations 247 236 327 308
# of economies 92 88 116 109
Adj. R2 0.054 0.173 0.175 0.257
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
F-test 6.561 5.174 37.12 12.77
Standard errors (clustered at the country level) shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
dian.
Column 1 of table (5) reports the result for countries with independent central
banks and column 2 for countries with non-independent central banks. The finan-
cial inclusion coefficient is statistically significant for independent central banks
but not for that of the other group, although the magnitudes are similar. A care-
ful interpretation of these results is that central bank independence does not play
a significant role in the relationships observed.
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Table 5: Estimation Results: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indep Dep Developing Developed
Variables CPI CPI Tax CPI Tax CPI
FI (log) -2.666** -2.143 1.152* -2.686** -1.495 0.745
(1.173) (1.458) (0.603) (1.118) (1.083) (1.155)
Openness 0.0317 0.0276 0.0579*** 0.0444 0.0240 0.0317
(0.0317) (0.0409) (0.0160) (0.0534) (0.0162) (0.0224)
Debt 0.0733 0.0821* -0.0608** 0.186*** 0.00263 -0.0496
(0.0572) (0.0474) (0.0239) (0.0437) (0.0274) (0.0397)
COR -0.232 0.0716 -0.0716 -0.000308 -0.0322 -0.191*
(0.145) (0.112) (0.0640) (0.112) (0.0437) (0.111)
∆ GDP -4.896 -1.083 4.310 -5.152 6.324 0.466
(14.54) (9.350) (9.192) (17.71) (4.567) (7.372)
UNP 0.178 0.121 0.420 -0.104 0.0449
(0.213) (0.337) (0.378) (0.0761) (0.163)
Constant 4.685 -5.459 13.89*** -9.264 15.61*** 14.12*
(7.979) (9.250) (3.055) (8.214) (2.440) (8.173)
Observations 144 164 95 142 141 166
# of economies 50 59 37 51 51 58
Adj.R2,Wald χ2 0.389 0.163 0.428 0.371 0.112 0.259
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test 9.171 7.610 6.234 11.13 1.934 7.302
Standard errors (clustered at the country level) shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
7.2 Developing vs. Developed Countries
I group low-income and low-middle-income countries into ”Developing” countries
and high-middle-income and high-income countries into ”Developed” countries.
For developing countries the coefficients on financial inclusion are significant and
comparable in size to those from the basic regression for both tax and inflation
(CPI). For developed countries the coefficient is not significant for either dependent
variable.
Given that developed countries have a more developed taxation system, increasing
financial inclusion does not affect tax revenue or inflation.
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Table 6: Estimation Results: Different Measures of Financial Inclusion (World
Bank)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Tax CPI Tax CPI Tax CPI
FI (log) 1.269** -2.291***
(0.490) (0.860)
FI+ (log) 1.192*** -1.796**
(0.380) (0.742)
FI- (log) -0.290 -0.0412
(0.255) (0.490)
Constant 15.69*** 1.575 15.56*** 2.258 13.36*** 1.768
(2.107) (6.350) (2.090) (6.429) (4.162) (8.300)
Observations 236 308 236 308 93 129
# of economies 88 109 88 109 54 71
Adj. R2 0.173 0.257 0.182 0.250 0.111 0.011
F-test 5.174 12.77 5.436 13.18 1.455 1.991
Standard errors (clustered at the country level) shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients of all CV are suppressed, Country FE and Year FE: YES;
7.3 Other Measures of Financial Inclusion
Tables 6 and 7 estimate the impact on tax revenue and inflation using different
measures of financial inclusion from the World Bank and the IMF dataset, respec-
tively. The coefficients on the control variables are suppressed.
In table 6, I inserted Columns 2 and 4 from table (4) for comparison. Compared
to these earlier estimates, the coefficients for FI+ in columns 3 and 4 are similar
in size and statistically significant. However, the coefficients for FI- in columns 5
and 6 are not statistically significant. One possible reason for this surprising result
is that FI-, which measures access to mobile money only, has been collected only
in the years 2014 and 2017.
The estimation results presented in Table 7 use the measures of financial inclu-
sion from the IMF dataset. In column 1, the coefficient on the value of mobile
transactions (MTV) with regard to tax revenue is positive (0.0525) and statisti-
cally significant. The interpretation of the MTV coefficient is that an increase in
the value of mobile phone transactions of 100 percentage points relative to GDP
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Table 7: Estimation Results: Different Measures of Financial Inclusion (IMF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





MAU (log) -0.123 -0.321*
(0.110) (0.176)
Constant 11.16* -0.543 9.377 -3.110 7.935*** -2.968
(5.692) (3.349) (5.702) (2.524) (2.322) (3.363)
Observations 154 243 155 339 161 237
# of economies 44 60 44 61 38 46
Adj. R2 0.175 0.132 0.124 0.196 0.175 0.122
F-test 2.706 3.474 2.031 6.606 3.344 3.323
Standard errors (clustered at the country level) shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients of all CV are suppressed, Country FE and Year FE: YES;
increases tax revenue by 5.25 percentage points. In column 2, the MTV coefficient
is not statistically significant.
In column 4, the coefficient on the number of mobile transactions (MTN) with
regard to inflation (CPI) is negative (-0.0526) and statistically significant. Accord-
ingly, an increase of 100 mobile phone transactions per person reduces inflation
by 5.26 percentage points. However, the coefficient in column 3 is not statistically
significant (though it has the expected positive sign).
The last two columns, 5 and 6, show the results from regressing the number of
active mobile money accounts per person on tax revenues and inflation (CPI). In
this case, only column 6 has a statistically significant coefficient.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper joins the discussion on the causes and the impact of financial inclusion
by analyzing the link to technology and to monetary as well as fiscal policy.
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I show that inefficient technologies, which lead to high costs of access to financial
institutions, and an inefficient taxation system can lead to low levels of financial
inclusion, low tax revenue and high (optimal) levels of inflation. Lowering the cost
of access and improving taxation has the potential to not only raise financial inclu-
sion (which in itself brings significant benefits for households and the economy as
a whole) but also to increase the ability of governments to tax directly and lessens
the pressure to do so through higher inflation.
The paper presents empirical evidence that this is already happening. One possi-
ble cause of the sudden and fast improvements in financial inclusion is arguably
the rise of mobile payment services, cheaper identification, cheaper as well as
faster payment infrastructure, and the appropriate regulation of these new pay-
ment providers.
The current empirical analysis does not provide a final and definitive answer on
causality. I leave it to future research to address the issue of endogeneity and to
find a suitable instrumental variable that correlates with financial inclusion but is




Consider the welfare function, which, after taking the integral, can be written as
W = γ
(




kγ2 + (1− γ)(L − c− (1− θ)τ)










































Since the first two terms cancel each other out, I am left with equation (15).
First Derivative: Positive for µ = 1
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Re-arranging equation (15) to ∂W∂µ =
∂L
∂µ (1− γρ)− ∂τ∂µ(1− θ + θγ) = 0 and inserting the
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1 Introduction
A central counterparty (CCP) reduces the propagation of shocks in a financial
system by guaranteeing the performance of financial contracts (e.g., derivatives)
between two parties, even when one party at some point is not able or willing to
meet her obligations. If a default occurs, CCPs re-allocate all the contracts of the
defaulting agent to the surviving agents. Auctions are used in cases where the
position to be transferred is large in relation to market liquidity or where a central
market does not exist. CCPs can use auctions to incentivise the surviving agents
to provide higher bids than the current market price and, thus, avoid fire sale con-
ditions, as demonstrated by Vuillemey [2019]. Potential losses that could occur as
a result of the auction will typically be covered by the defaulting agent’s collateral.
Should the losses exceed the available collateral, the CCP and the surviving agents
step in to cover any remaining losses based on a pre-defined loss allocation mech-
anism. An incentive that some CCPs started to implement recently is to juniorize
the default fund contributions of those bidders who provided low or no bids at all
(see CPMI-IOSCO [2019]).
To reduce systemic risks in the OTC derivatives markets, the G20 announced
in 2009 that standardized OTC derivative contracts should be cleared through
CCPs.1 As a result, regulators throughout the world mandate the use of CCPs for
OTC derivative contracts that are deemed sufficiently standardized. The CCP’s
market share in OTC derivatives markets has rapidly grown between 2008 and
2019, mainly for interest rate derivatives from 40% to 75% and for credit default
swaps from 0% to 55%, according to BIS OTC derivatives statistics 2019.
Defaults at CCP are rare events, but in the last decade two notable defaults have
occurred. The default of Lehman Brothers in 2008 has triggered auctions, liquida-
tions and transfers at CCPs around the globe. For example LCH - a London-based
CCP - auctioned, liquidated and transferred a $9 trillion interest rate swap portfo-
lio (Umar et al. [2018]) and CME - a Chicago-based CCP - auctioned off sizeable
energy, interest rate, and equities futures and options contracts together with
1“All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic
trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012
at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally
cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.”
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$2 billion margin deposits (Valukas [2010]). Both CCPs successfully re-allocated
Lehman’s contracts without having to use their own or the surviving members’
funds. However, in 2008 Einar Aas, a Norwegian trader, defaulted which triggered
an auction of energy futures at Nasdaq OMX - a Swedish-based CCP - which lead
to a loss of AC7 million for the CCP, and AC107 million for the surviving members
(Umar et al. [2018]).
All auctions mentioned above have been conducted with a few selected bidders
only without any loss arrangement geared towards incentivising bidders to provide
higher bids. Even though CCPs have gained practical experience with auctions
in the past, little is known about the theoretical properties of recently introduced
incentives schemes under different loss scenarios.
In this paper, I will analyse a simple version of a juniorization scheme where the
winner does not lose her default fund contribution (but the losers do) and combine
it with the loss allocation mechanism of a CCP. In addition, I analyse the bidding
strategy in case the default fund is exhausted by defining how the residual losses
are distributed.
Research Question and Approach
What are the CCP’s and the agents’ incentives in an auction? Do the incentives
depend on whether the default fund is exhausted or not? Can a CCP incentivise
bidders to provide higher bids and how does this affect the losses carried by the
CCP and the other non-defaulting agents? Are the bidders willing to participate in
such auctions and continue meeting their obligations? This paper seeks to provide
answers to these questions.
What makes auctions conducted by CCPs particularly interesting and different
from the standard literature on auctions is its loss allocation; depending on the
size of the loss, the bidders might have to carry some of the losses themselves, i.e.,
the payoff of an agent does not need to be zero if she fails to win the auction.
Analysing CCP auctions is important for two reasons. First, CCPs have gathered
some knowledge over the years on how auctions work in less extreme cases2 but
2For example, LCH and CME auctioned off Lehman’s positions in 2008, or the auction at
Nasdaq OMX in 2018 triggered by a default of a member.
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have no or very little experience in situations where the default fund is entirely
used up. Second, with the regulatory push to mandatory clearing, a broader group
of agents now use CCPs. Auctions have been designed towards a smaller and more
homogeneous group of participants. This is currently being rethought, including
inviting clients to the auction or using the loss allocation to encourage bidding.3
A consistent and clear framework supports the evaluation of possible choices.
The approach is best described by way of an example supported by Figure 1, which
depicts time on the x-axis and the value of the financial contract of the defaulted
agent on the y-axis. Assuming that an agent defaults at time D, the earliest date
a CCP can conduct an auction is at D+η. As long as the CCP has not transferred
the contract to another agent, she is subject to mark to market gains or losses.
In the example provided, the value of the contract falls between default D and
auction A ≥ D+ η, leading to a holding loss of vD− vA at the time of the auction.
In addition, during the auction, the winning bidder might provide a bid β∗ < vA,
which is lower than the value of the contract leading to an additional auction loss.
The overall loss vD − β∗ will be allocated by the CCP according to pre-defined
rules. Typically, the losses are first allocated to the defaulting agent (by using
initial margins and default fund contribution). If that is not sufficient, then the
CCP’s share of equity (or skin in the game) is used. Finally, the CCP can use
the surviving agents’ remaining default fund and by applying additional recovery
measures.
In this paper, I analyse the optimal bidding strategy given a loss allocation that
covers all possible sizes of losses, investigate which loss allocation minimizes a
CCP’s expected loss, consider whether recovery measures (e.g., usage of initial
margins, cash calls, variation margin haircuts and tear-ups) can cover any possible
size of losses, and what the optimal time of auction A from the viewpoint of the
CCP is. Finally, I analyse auctions with a subset of agents or where a tear-up (or
termination) of contracts looms if the auction fails to provide a minimum prize.
3A recently published discussion paper CPMI-IOSCO [2019] aims at facilitating the sharing of
existing practices and considerations that CCPs might want to take into account when designing
an auction.
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Figure 1: Auction Loss and Loss Allocation
Main Findings
First, I show that incentives can increase the auction revenue in a narrow sense but
do no affect the payoffs of the CCP and the surviving agents. A CCP can increase
the bids of the surviving agents by making the winner pay less for the auction
loss. This incentive can be thought of as a simple juniorization of default fund
contributions. The larger the loss that the winning agent can avoid, the higher
the equilibrium price that the bidders submit. However, higher bidding does not
translate into higher payoffs. This is true for both the CCP and the surviving
agents because the gain of receiving higher bids is entirely consumed by the trans-
fer to the winning bidder. Thus, the Revenue Equivalence Theorem holds if the
transfers to the winner are considered.
Second, I show that the composition of agents in an auction can have a mate-
rial impact on the outcome of the auction. Conducting auctions with a subset
of agents has distributional effects because the agents invited to the auction are
always better off than those who are not. The result crucially depends on how
good the CCPs are at picking agents with high private values. Conversely, inviting
additional agents to the auction (e.g., clients) could be inefficient (in the sense that
the bidder with the highest private value does not need to win) but the CCP and
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all losing bidders are better off when additional bidders are invited to the auction.
Third, I show that recovery measures can affect the CCP’s incentives in an auc-
tion. A CCP can design a loss allocation arrangement where the maximal loss
is restricted to a share of her equity (typically required by regulators and called
skin-in-the game) and that any losses beyond that can be allocated to the sur-
viving agents (by using exhaustive recovery measures). The recovery measures
can be designed in such a way that the surviving agents are not only willing to
participate in an auction but, once the winning bid and losses are announced, are
willing to meet all their obligations. Because the maximal loss of a CCP is capped,
the CCP might in cases of high losses prefer to wait until the value of the contract
has eventually rebounded rather than choosing to swiftly conduct an auction.
Finally, I show that tear-ups (partial or full) inflict higher costs on the financial
system compared to other recovery measures, such as cash calls, variation margin
haircuts or usage of initial margins. Thus, agents prefer to share the necessary
costs in order to avoid a tear-up. However, the auction fails to coordinate the
actions of the bidders, leading to an inferior equilibrium for all. Tear-ups should
be avoided.
Relevant Literature
This paper draws on the well-established auction theory developed by many au-
thors dating back to Vickrey [1961]. The literature on all-pay auctions (for exam-
ple Baye et al. [1993] on interest group lobbying) resembles the problem of a CCP
auction in that the losers might face negative payoffs. However, there is a crucial
difference from the CCP auction in that the losing bidder’s payment depends on
the bids of others and not on her own bid.
Ferrara and Li [2017] apply the auction theory to CCPs. The authors analyse
CCP auctions under static penalty schemes and note the inefficiencies that such
an approach can have. In contemporaneous work Huang and Zhu [unpublished]
study the incentives of bidders in a uniform-price CCP auction and find that ju-
niorization of the guarantee fund contributions can elevate the equilibrium price.
The present paper extends the literature on CCP auctions in three ways. First,
I study not only the incentives of the bidders in an auction but also those of the
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CCP. This allows to identify potential moral hazard problems inherent in a CCP.
I show that in case of extreme losses, a CCP might not act in the interest of her
participants. Second, I consider auctions at all levels of losses, including where
recovery measures become necessary. This allows to analyze the compatibility of
different recovery measures with the auction format. A new result presented in
this paper is that tear-ups do not incentivise the bidders to provide higher bids,
even though all bidders would be willing to pay to avoid this recovery measure.
Third, I explicitly formulate the CCPs budget as well as the auction participants’
participation and termination constraint thereby extracting additional insights,
including the interaction between participating and non-participation agents as
well as the losses incurred on the whole financial system. An additional insight
presented in this paper is the irrelevance of incentives, i.e. that incentives increase
the size of the bids but do not affect the losses of the CCP or of the bidders. The
notation used in this paper is based on Krishna [2010].
In the following section, I provide a short description of CCPs, with a focus on
the loss allocation. In section 3, I characterize the model and state the CCP’s and
bidders’ maximization problem subject to the CCP’s loss allocation and formulate
the constraints. In section 4, examples of loss allocation are discussed and the
optimal bidding strategy is formulated. The general results are presented in three
separate sections, as follows: the optimal loss allocation (section 5), the complete-
ness of loss allocation and asymmetric auctions (section 6) and the optimal time
of auction (section 7). Section 8 contains additional considerations, including auc-
tions with a subset of agents and auctions against the background of a tear-up of
contracts if the auction fails to provide a minimum prize. Section 9 closes with
conclusions. The appendix contains all relevant proofs.
2 A Primer on Central Counterparties
A CCP is ”an entity that interposes itself between counterparties to contracts
traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and
the seller to every buyer and thereby ensuring the performance of open contracts.”
(CPSS [2016]). A CCP consists of a set of rules and procedures defining i) how the
liabilities arising from these contracts are measured and covered with the agent’s
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collateral, ii) how these contracts will be re-allocated if one agent is unable (or
unwilling) to fulfil them and iii) how losses will be allocated that might arise
during the transfer of the positions to a new agent.4 I will briefly discuss each
element in turn.
Measures liabilities and requires collateral : The CCP continuously measures each
agent’s current and future liability arising from all contracts submitted for clearing.
To limit and manage its counterparty risk, a CCP requires from all trading agents
variation margin, initial margin and default fund contributions. The variation
margins α is a cash payment from the agent with a positive liability to the agent
with a negative liability. Variation margins, once paid, ensure that the current net
liability of each agent is set to zero. The sizes of the variation margin payments
cannot be predicted since they are a function of a stochastic market variable.
In case an agent stops paying variation margins (and subsequently defaults), it
might take time for the CCP to transfer the contract to another agent. Any losses
resulting from changes in the valuation of the contract during the transfer period
are covered by the other two types of collateral. The initial margins γ needs to
be paid by both agents involved in the transaction once a contract is submitted
to the CCP for clearing. The initial margins of a defaulting agent can be used to
cover losses that might arise during the transfer of the positions to another agent.5
Finally, the default fund contribution δ of each agent can be used to cover the
losses arising from its own default but - as opposed to initial margins - from the





Re-allocates defaulter’s positions : A CCP can re-allocate the defaulting agent’s
position by way of an auction to the highest bidder. To cover the losses that
4These sets of rules and procedures have evolved over more than a hundred years and differ
substantially (see for example Kroszner [1999]). Recent regulatory initiatives (mainly the Prin-
ciples for Financial Market Infrastructure CPMI-IOSCO [2012]) have, however, contributed to a
homogenization of the CCP’s rules and procedures.
5To be precise and connect it to the auction, the initial margins aim to cover losses that might
arise in the period between market price vD, i.e., when the defaulting participant paid its last
variation margin, and any market price that might arise at the time of the auction vA plus any
auction losses with a certain degree of confidence. The modelling of the initial margins of a CCP
is based on highly sophisticated risk models, which are not discussed in detail here.
6CCPs usually define the overall size of the default fund based on the overall level of risks
that they assumed. The size of the default fund is usually based on some stress tests.
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might arise as a result of the default and the following re-allocation, CCPs have
defined rules regarding how losses will be allocated.
Order Who Pays What Notation Auction View







2 Defaulting Agent’s Default Fund Contri-
bution
δ
3 CCP’s Share of Equity (Skin in the Game) ε







pay5 Surviving Agents’ Committed Additional
Resources (Recovery Measures) including
Cash Calls, use of Initial Margins, and
Variation Margin Haircuts
-
6 CCP’s Remaining Equity 1− ε
Table 1: Loss Allocation of a CCP
Allocates Losses : There are three aspects to be considered. First, the CCP defines
the order of who has to pay what (see Table 1), which is often coined as the
default waterfall; typically the initial margin γ and default fund contribution δ
of the defaulting agent and then the CCP’s share of equity ε (or skin in the
game) are used first. If that is not sufficient, then the surviving agents’ default
fund contributions and additional recovery measures are used. At the end of the
waterfall, the CCP’s remaining equity 1 − ε will be used. Second, in cases where
the surviving agents have to pay, the CCP can set up rules regarding how the
losses are to be spread across the surviving agents and connect it to the outcome
of an auction. For example, the CCP can equally share all losses or juniorise the
default fund contribution by making the winner of the auction pay less compared
the losers. Third, if the losses are covered by the first three layers, then from
the viewpoint of a bidder, it is an auction where ”somebody else pays” for the
losses. It is only when the losses exceed γ + δ + ε that the ”bidders pay” auction
point of view occurs. In such a case, the bidders can either lose their default fund
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contribution or have to commit additional resources, including cash calls, use of
initial margins, or variation margin haircuts. These so called recovery measures
are treated in detail in chapter 6.
3 The Model
The model consists of one continuous-time period, where t ∈ [0, 1] depicts time.
The economy is populated by N+1 risk-neutral agents holding two types of illiquid
risky assets and one risk-neutral CCP. On the date t = 0, the agents can agree
on a financial contract mandatorily cleared by a CCP. On the date t = D, one
trader unexpectedly defaults due to an external valuation shock. The CCP can
conduct an auction at time A ∈ [D+ η, 1), i.e., at the earliest, D+ η after default
or at the latest, right before the expiration t = 1 to re-allocate the contract of the
defaulted party. The losses will be shared based on a pre-agreed loss allocation
arrangement. On the date 1, the payoffs of all risky assets are determined and,
thus, all uncertainty is resolved.
3.1 Endowment and Cleared Market
On the date t = 0, the CCP is endowed with one unit of equity owned by third-
parties and each agent is endowed with cash m and a risky asset. Let B(t) =
Bt follow some continuous-time stochastic martingale process where B0 = 0 and
Et[B1] = Bt. One half of the agents’ (type 1) risky asset yields π + B1 at t = 1,
where π is a fixed return and B1 is the final value of the continuous-time stochastic
process Bt. The other half of the agents’ (type 2) risky asset yields π − B1, i.e.,
there is no aggregate risk because the aggregate supply of risk is zero.7 Both types
cannot dispose of the asset even if π + Bt < 0 for type 1 and π − Bt < 0 for type
2.
The agents carry private cost ci of holding the risky part Bt of the asset, which
can be interpreted as the cost of managing the market risk or capital costs.
7The risky asset can be interpreted as a project that the agent has invested in and cannot
trade with a fixed return and a variable return, which depends on some stochastic market value,
for example, the interest or exchange rate.
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Each type 1 agent is randomly matched with another type 2 agent at a central
market where they trade a contract and subsequently clear with a CCP.8 I formalize
this contract as follows: type 1 will pay B1 to type 2 at time 1. This contract
shields both agents involved in the trade from the market risk Bt and so the cost
ci can be avoided.
Since this contract is cleared, each agent i commits to the CCP to i) to pay
the variation margin αi throughout the lifetime of the contract,
9 ii) pay the initial
margin γ and default fund contribution δ at t = 0, and iii) share any losses based on
a pre-agreed loss allocation arrangement, as depicted in Table 1. For each cleared
contract, the agents bear uniform clearing costs k, which can be interpreted as the
likelihood of an agent losing her default fund contribution or having to meet other
obligations. I take all parameters as given and do not provide for the optimal size
of collateral or equity.10
An agent i will prefer to trade the contract on a centrally cleared market as long
as k ≤ ci. To keep the analysis simple, I will set k = 0 and assume that the agent
always has sufficient cash to meet any variation margin payment αt at any time.
3.2 Default Management Auction Problem
At time t = D, a type 2 agent is hit by an exogenous negative valuation shock
and, as a result, the agent stops paying the variation margins and subsequently
defaults. The value of the contract at the time that the defaulting agent paid its
last variation margin was vD = ED[B1] = BD. The CCP can conduct a single-
item first-price auction at any time A ∈ [D + η, 1) to re-allocate the contractual
8The agents could trade without a CCP. I assume that trading these contracts is subject to
mandatory clearing.
9From the viewpoint of type 2, her current liability is −Bt; therefore, the value of the contract
at time t from her point of view is vt = Bt. To keep the current liability at zero at all times, the
variation margin (again from the viewpoint of type 2) must be defined as αt = −Bt.
10Note, that the size of the initial margin γ and default fund contribution δ required for each
contract cleared, CCP’s equity and recovery measures that the CCP has at hand, as well as the
order in which these financial resources would be used are given. However, even though I do
not model the optimal size of the initial margin and default fund, there is an implicit trade-off
that the CCP needs to consider. By increasing the required financial resources from her clearing
agents, the CCP reduces the likelihood of her share of equity ε being used but increases the
clearing cost k. Therefore, some agents would no longer find it profitable to trade the contract
with the CCP if k > ci.
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obligations of the defaulting party to one of the remaining non-defaulting N agents.
The value of the auctioned contract vA = EA[B1] = BA is publicly observable.
The private value xi = vA − ci that a bidder i attaches to the object at the time
of the auction A is the value of the contract vA minus the private costs ci of
holding the (additional) auctioned contractual obligation. The cost ci re-appears
because any agent holding an additional contract would not be optimally hedged
any longer and would hold the risk Bt on her books. The distribution of the cost
ci ∼ U [0, 1] is i.i.d. across agents and is common knowledge. Therefore, from the
viewpoint of the CCP, the private value of each bidder is uniformly distributed
on the interval xi ∼ U [vA − 1, vA]. The corresponding cumulative distribution
function is F (xi) = (xi − (vA − 1)) with density f(xi) = 1.
The CCP’s Maximization Problem
Given that an agent has defaulted, the CCP conducts an auction to minimize the
expected loss of equity LCCP by choosing the optimal time of auction A, and loss





0 if vD − β(vA − 1) ≤ γ + δ
ε if vD − β(vA) ≥ γ + δ + ε
(0, ε) if xi ∈ [vA, vA−1], where γ + δ < vD − β(xi) < γ + δ + ε
(1)
where β(y) is the equilibrium bidding strategy of the winning bidder with private
value y. The above equation simply states that the expected loss of a CCP con-
ducting an auction at time A can have three states, as follows: either her share of
equity will not be lost (first line), will definitely be lost (second line), or some of
the equity will be lost (third line).
The Agent’s Maximization Problem
I will now define the equilibrium bidding strategy β of the bidders. The bidder i
providing bid bi faces the following payoffs where b−i = max bj 6=i is the best bid of
11To simplify the analysis, I will generally assume that all agents participate in the auction.
Section 8.1 discusses the case where not all agents are invited to the auction.
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xi − bi −W(bi) if bi > b−i
−L(b−i) if bi < b−i
(2)
Note that ties where bi = b−i will occur with zero probability, so I will ignore it.
The payoff to the bidder i is xi − bi − W(bi) if she wins and is −L(b−i) if she
loses.12 W(bi) defines the loss or profit a CCP will inflict on bidder i with the
bid bi given that she has won. L(b−i) defines the loss or profit a CCP will inflict
on bidder i given that bidder −i with bid b−i has won. The loss allocation as
described in section 2, including all possible recovery measures, can be analysed
in this framework.
Given that the other bidders follow the symmetric, increasing, and differentiable
equilibrium strategy β, bidder i maximizes the following expected profit by choos-
ing the optimal bid bi as follows:
π(xi, bi) = G(β




where G(y) = F (y)N−1 denotes the distribution of the highest order statistics of
the remaining N − 1 bidders that bidder i is competing against.13 If the bidder
wins, then her expected profit is given by the first expression. If she loses, then her
expected loss is given by the integral of the loss function and the corresponding
distribution of the highest bid. The last expression expresses costs ξi ≤ ci, which
reflects the agents indirect exposure towards market risks should the CCP decide
not to hold the auction at the earliest point Ā = η +D but to delay it. Therefore
d(A = Ā) = 0 and d(A > Ā) = 1.
Forming the first-order condition and noting that in equilibrium bi = β(xi), I
12In this paper, I use a special case of the loss allocation 〈W(·),L(·)〉, where only my bid bi
and the highest bid of all the other bids b−i define the loss allocation. A more general function
would require as input all bids; thus, W : RN → R. Such a function would be more difficult to
manage since it would require the handling of the 2nd, 3rd,..., Nth-highest order statistics.













The equation above is the basis for calculating the equilibrium bidding strategy and
the expected CCP’s auction loss. Note that even though in (2) the payoff L(b−i)
depends on the winning bid of somebody else, which cannot be known to the
bidder in advance, the first-order condition only requires her own bid β(xi) as the
input. Although no solution to this general form can be presented, I can note some
general properties. Since β is increasing, and G(xi) as well as g(xi) are positive but
fixed for agent i, there are two ways that the optimal bidding strategy can increase.
First, if increasing the bid leads to a lower payment W ′(β(xi)) < 0 and, second, if
the losses if I lose are bigger than the losses if I win, i.e.,W(β(xi))−L(β(xi)) < 0.
Constraints
There are three types of constraints that must be imposed on loss allocation
〈W(·),L(·)〉.
First, the overall loss has to be accurately covered. In the case where the surviv-
ing agents are paying at the margin, the budget constraint can be written for any
winning bid β∗ as follows:
(vD − β∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss
− (γ + δ + ε)︸ ︷︷ ︸
used collateral
= (N − 1)L(β∗) +W(β∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
loss allocation
(5)
Second, the CCP cannot force a bidder to participate in an auction that offers her
less expected utility with the optimal bidding strategy β than when not participat-
ing. The participation constraint is satisfied if the expected profit of participating






expected loss when not participating
∀i (6)
Third, the agent could - once the outcome of the auction has been determined -
decide to leave the CCP for good to avoid sharing in the losses. A CCP does not
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allow agents to terminate contracts during a default and has contractual powers to
inflict losses l on any leaving agent. The CCP could return the agent’s collateral γ
and δ only after subtracting any losses that the agent contractually agreed to share
or she could refuse to pay the variation margins α to the leaving agent. In addition,
the leaving agent would suffer private costs ci ≥ 0. Therefore, to guarantee that
ex post no bidders prefer to leave the CCP after any winning bid β∗(xi) has been
announced, the following termination constraint must be satisfied:
L(β∗(xi)) ≤ c−i + l, where c−i = min cj 6=i (7)
The exact form of l will depend on the losses a CCP can inflict on a leaving agent
and will be defined in chapter 6.
Definition 1 A loss allocation 〈W(·),L(·)〉 that satisfies all three constraints in
(5), (6), and (7) for all possible sizes of holding losses vD − vA is complete.
3.3 Efficient Allocation
Assuming that the planner’s objective is to maximize the unweighted sum of
agents’ and the CCP’s utilities, the obvious solution to the social planners problem
is to allocate the position to the agent with the highest private value xh = max ci
immediately after the default has occurred. Any delay in auctioning off the posi-
tion inflicts costs on the financial system
∑
i ξi. An inefficient auction where the
position is allocated to an agent with a lower private value xl reduces aggregated
utility by xh − xl.
4 Optimal Bidding: Examples
I now turn to the detailed analysis of the bidder’s behaviour and consider the case
where somebody else pays (section 4.1), as well as two examples of a loss allocation
when the bidders pay at the margin (section 4.2). Additionally, I analyse situations
where it is ex ante not clear whether bidders will have to pay or not (section 4.3).
In the last section 4.4, I compare all loss allocation regimes. In all cases, a type 2
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agent defaults. Finally, I will use the following definition for an optimal bidding
strategy.
Definition 2 The optimal bidding strategy β(xi) for a bidder with private value
xi is such that it maximizes (3) given the time of the auction A, the number of
bidders N , and the loss allocation 〈W(·),L(·)〉 subject to budget condition (5).
The participation and termination constraints will not be considered at this point.
A full treatment of all conditions, including their completeness, is provided in
chapter 6.
4.1 Somebody Else Pays
The auction starts with the observation that the collateral of the defaulting agent
and the CCP’s share of equity are sufficient to cover the losses resulting from even
the lowest possible bid:
vD − β(vA − 1) ≤ γ + δ + ε
This includes the scenario where the position of the defaulting agent carries a
profit. Bidder i’s payoffs are expressed in equation (2), where the bidders do not
share any losses, so W(·) = L(·) = 0. The first-order condition
G(x)β′(x) = g(x)(x− β(x))
states that the expected marginal cost of increasing the bid (lhs) must equal the







(vA − 1) (8)
The bidders provide quotes that are lower than their private values. The bids
approach their private value as the number of bidders N increases.
The expected profit of a bidder with private value xi is as follows:
π(xi) =




Inviting more agents to the auction increases optimal bidding and reduces the
expected profit of the bidders. Finally, the expected loss of a CCP is zero LCCP =
0.
The result is very standard. I will use this bidding strategy as a benchmark.
4.2 Losses Covered by Bidders
In case the value of the position vA is such that the best possible bid exhausts the
defaulter’s collateral and the CCP’s share of equity, as follows:
vD − β(vA) > γ + δ + ε (9)
then the bidders will share the losses at the margin and the expected loss of a
CCP is her full share of equity LCCP = ε. In the following, I will discuss two loss
allocation arrangements subject to budget condition (5).
Example 1: Equal Loss Allocation
The equal loss allocation shares the losses equally among all surviving agents, i.e.,
for any winning bid β∗e , I have that We(β∗e ) = W(β∗e ) = L(β∗e ) > 0. Given the
budget constraint in (5), the loss allocation function can be expressed asWe(β∗e ) =
(vD−β∗e )−(γ+δ)
N
. The first-order condition, which is as follows:
N − 1
N
G(x)β′e(x) = g(x)(x− βe(x)) (10)







(vA − 1) (11)
leads to higher bidding compared to the benchmark, which can be best explained
by the first-order condition in (10). While the expected cost of increasing the bid
has been lowered by the factor N−1
N
< 1, the expected marginal profit remains the
same.












Example 2: Losers Loss Allocation
This loss allocation shares losses equally among the losing bidders - the winning
bidder does not share any losses, i.e., for any winning bid β∗w, I have Ww(β∗w) = 0,
and Lw(β∗w) > 0. Given the budget constraint, the losing bidders pay Lw(β∗w) =
(vD−β∗w)−(γ+δ+ε)
N−1 . Inserting this into the first-order condition (4), I obtain the fol-
lowing:
G(x)β′w(x) = g(x)(x− βw(x) + L(βw(x))) (12)













vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N
(13)
The expected profit of a bidder in the case that the losers’ loss allocation has the
same value as the profit of a bidder in the equal sharing function, i.e., πw(xi) =
πe(xi),∀i.
4.3 Overlapping Losses
Consider that there is a bid βe(ψ) = σ with ψ ∈ (vA − 1, vA) where the defaulting
agent’s collateral as well as the CCP’s equity share is used up, i.e.,
vD − σ = γ + δ + ε





xi − bi if bi > b−i ∧ bi ≥ σ
0 if bi < b−i ∧ bj ≥ σ
xi − bi −We(bi) if bi > b−i ∧ bi < σ
−We(b−i) if bi < b−i ∧ bj < σ
(14)
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which simply means that as long as the winning bid is equal to or higher than σ,
the bidders do not pay (because the defaulter’s collateral is sufficient) or else they
pay We(·). I will solve the problem by backward induction.
First, for those bidders whose optimal equilibrium bid lies below σ, only the last
three lines in equation (14) apply. The optimal bid b maximizes the following
expected profit (given that the other bidders follow some equilibrium strategy
βD):
π(x, bi) = G(β
−1




Since the bidder can only influence his own likelihood of winning and the lower
bound of the integral, the first-order condition as well as the optimal bid are
identical to equations (10) and (11).
Second, for any bidder whose bid is higher than or equal to σ, only the first two
lines of the payoff function apply. Therefore, she needs to find the optimal bid to
maximize the following profit:
π(x, bi) = G(β
−1
D (bi))(x− bi) (15)
To find the optimal bidding strategy, special attention needs to be paid to the
transition from bids below and above σ. The following reasoning is supported by
Figure (2); starting with the private value vA − 1, the optimal bidding strategy
follows βD = βe, as expressed in (11), until the private value ψ = β
−1
e (σ) is
reached, which constitutes the boundary between usage of the default fund or not.
At this point, i.e., A in the figure, the bidder’s loss allocation function drops to zero
(We = 0) and the optimal bidding-curve in such a case would be β, as expressed in
(8). However, jumping to point B is not an option since the bidder would re-enter
the range where the loss allocation function is not zero and she would immediately
jump back to the bidding curve βe and so forth. Moving horizontally to point C
and then following the β bidding curve is not optimal either since any bidder on
this vertical line could increase her likelihood of winning by increasing her bid by
a small amount and be better off. The solution is, therefore, a convergence to the
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(vA − 1) + κ if βD ≥ σ
βe(xi) if βD < σ
(16)




The implication is that all bidders, even those who provide bids that will not use
the default fund, increase their bids.
Figure 2: Optimal Bidding βD when Bidders Might Have to Pay
Finally, it is easy to show that the bidding curve βw must intersect the bidding
curve βe at point A, so that βD for βD ≥ σ follows the same path, independent
of the loss allocation arrangement (as depicted on right panel in Figure 3). Take






, inserting vD − (γ + δ +
ε) = βe(ψ), I obtain βw(ψ) = βe(ψ), which proves that bidding curves βe and βw
intersect at xi = ψ.
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4.4 Comparison of the Loss Allocation Functions
A comparison of the optimal bidding strategies shows the following pattern.
First, the left panel of Figure 3 shows that for each private value xi ∈ [vA− 1, vA],
I have that β ≤ βe < βw, where β plots the optimal bidding curve in case the
defaulting agent or the CCP covers the marginal costs (somebody else pays from
the viewpoint of the bidders), βe tracks the optimal bidding curve in case the
default fund of the bidders is used but where the auction loss is shared equally
among the bidders, and, finally, βw is the optimal bidding where only the losing
bidders cover the marginal auction losses. βw leads to aggressive bidding of all
parties, especially of those with low private values (or high costs ci).
Second, the right panel of figure 3 shows that the above result is only valid as long
as the bids lead to the bidders marginally sharing the loss, i.e., where vD − β >
γ + δ + ε. As soon as the bids enter the space where somebody else (the CCP)
pays, then βw = βe, i.e., the bidders provide the same bid, independent of the
loss allocation, which means that the CCP’s expected LCCP (βe) = LCCP (βw) in
equation (1) is equal for both loss allocation arrangements.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Bidding
Third, the expected profit of the bidders, as shown in the preceding sections,
follows π(xi) > πe(xi) = πw(xi), i.e., the expected profit of the bidders is highest,
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in the case that somebody else pays. However, there is no difference in the expected
profit for the equal and the losers’ loss allocation.
5 Optimal Loss Allocation
In this chapter, I will analyse whether a CCP can minimize her expected loss by
choosing an optimal loss allocation 〈W∗(·),L∗(·)〉, as defined below.
Definition 3 The optimal loss allocation of a CCP 〈W∗(·),L∗(·)〉 when conduct-
ing an auction at time A with N number of participants, minimizes the expected
loss of the CCP given by (1) subject to the budget condition (5).
I can formulate the following two propositions (see proof in the appendix).
Proposition 1 If the bidders might have to pay, then a bidder’s as well as a CCP’s
expected (as well as ex ante) losses are independent of the CCP’s loss allocation
〈W(·),L(·)〉, i.e., any loss allocation is optimal.
Intuitively, an agent optimizes Z(xi) = β(xi) +W(β(xi)) - the payment she would
need to make to the CCP if she wins - which depends on exogenous factors and is
not affected by the loss allocation W(·). Given the optimal Z(xi), then L(xi) can
be directly derived and the expected profit of a bidder is shown to be independent







(vA − 1) +
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Proposition 2 If the bidders might have to pay, then a CCP can incentivise
higher bidding by reducing the loss allocation of the winner W(·).
The proof immediately follows from proposition 1. Since Z(xi) is independent
of the loss allocation function, the optimal bidding strategy adjusts to the loss
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allocation function, as follows: β(xi) = Z(xi)−W(β(xi)).
It is clear from the two propositions that by designing loss allocation 〈W∗(·),L∗(·)〉,
a CCP can affect the optimal bidding strategy β but not the expected loss of the
CCP nor of the bidder.
6 Completeness of Loss Allocation
A CCP can use recovery measures to allocate uncovered losses (see CPMI-IOSCO
[2017] for a discussion). In this chapter I will consider cash calls, use of initial
margins, and variation margin haircuts and analyse whether they are complete in
the sense of Definition 1.
Proposition 1 simplifies the analysis in the following way. First, it can be shown
that the PC from equation (6) is always satisfied when using the generally valid
expressions from equation (17), which means that the PC is always satisfied for
all types of loss allocation arrangements as long as the non-participating agent
is subject to the same loss allocation arrangement as the participating bidders.
Therefore, to verify completeness, I need to check only for the BC and the TC (see
the proof in the appendix for proposition 4).
Second, for a given holding loss, the TC can be violated or not depending on the
private value of the winning bidder and the bidder with the second highest bid. It
can be shown (again based on the generally valid payments from equation (17))
that the TC is never violated whenever L(βe(vA)) ≤ l, i.e., I need to check only
for the situation where the bidder i with private cost ci = 0 wins and the second
highest bidder j’s private cost infinitesimally approaches zero, i.e., lim c−i → 0
(see the proof in the appendix for proposition 4).
For ease of exposition, I will treat the default fund δ as already lost to the bidders.
However, the CCP could organize an auction where she shields the winner from
losing her default fund as well as from any additional recovery measures. As
shown in proposition 2, this would increase the bidding dramatically, but based
on proposition 1, would not affect the expected losses nor the ex post losses of the
bidders or the CCP.
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Cash Calls
This recovery measure covers additional losses by simply calling additional cash
from the surviving agents so that given the winning bid β∗, the net loss is met
by cash-calls W(β∗) from the winning agent and L(β∗) from the N − 1 losing
agents. In principle, the amount of cash that a CCP can call from the bidders is
uncapped.14 The budget constraint can be formulated as follows:
(vD − β∗)− (γ +D + ε) =W(β∗) + (N − 1)L(β∗)
Since the default fund is already lost, the initial margin γ represents the maximum
loss that a CCP can inflict on a losing bidder who wants to leave. For the TC to
always be satisfied, I must have the following:
L(β∗) ≤ γ
The l.h.s depicts the cash call that a losing bidder would need to pay-in and the
r.h.s depicts the maximal loss that a CCP can inflict on the leaving agent.
Use of Initial Margins
Additional losses are met simply by writing down the pre-paid initial margins,
which the surviving agents would need to remargin again. It is obvious that the
BC is violated whenever the loss is too big, i.e., as follows:
(vD − β∗e )− (γ +D + ε) > Nγ
The TC is met since prepaid resources are used to cover the losses.
Variation Margin Haircuts
This recovery tool achieves the budget balance by writing down the unrealized
gains of in-the-money positions of the non-defaulting agents. Since I assume that
a type 2 agent defaulted and losses occurred subsequently, all N1 type 1 agents
14It has, however, become practice for the CCP to limit cash calls by a multiple of each agent’s
default fund contribution δ.
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made gains and would be subject to vmgh. Since the loss-sharing applies only to





xi − bi − δ −W1(bi) if bi > b−i
−δ − L1(b−i) if bi < b−i
(18)
whereW1(·) and L1(·) refer to the vmgh applied to type 1 agents only. This asym-
metric loss allocation leads to a situation where type 1 agents bid more aggressively
than type 2 members, i.e., β1(xi) > β2(xi), but where both types provide higher
bids compared to where one type bids on its own. Two results immediately follow.
First, asymmetric auctions can be inefficient since for a small enough ε > 0, it is
the case that β1(xi − ε) > β2(xi + ε), so that the bidder with the higher private
costs might obtain the position. Second, not allowing type 2 agents to participate
ensures efficiency but reduces the competition between bidders and increases the
CCP’s expected loss. The results can be generalized as follows:
Proposition 3 Auctions with asymmetric loss allocation can be inefficient. Bid-
ders who are subject to the loss allocation bid more aggressively than those who are
not. Adding latter can still increase the overall bidding, reduce the CCPs expected
loss, and the losing bidders ex post loss.
Continuing with the analysis of completeness, I will analyse for ease of exposition
the equal loss allocation function and note that the maximum vmgh a CCP can
apply to any type 1 agent is vD − vA.15 The BC is always met whenever the
following holds:
vD−β∗e < (γ+D+ε)+N1(vD−vA) ⇐⇒ vA−β∗e < (γ+D+ε)+(N1−1)(vD−vA)
The difference vA − β∗e is driven by the number of auction participants N and the
private cost c∗i of the winning bidder. The equation shows that the private cost of
the winning bidder would need to be unrealistically large to violate this inequality.
Basically, the difference between the market price and the winning bid would need
to be large enough to wipe out all prepaid collateral as well as the holding loss
15This requires that the CCP stopped paying the variation margin to type 1 members imme-
diately after the default.
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multiplied by (N1 − 1).
Finally, the TC is always met since agent type 1 cannot dispose of the risky asset
and therefore would be subject to the valuation loss vD − vA anyway. In the
following, I want to explore the TC in the case that the agents would be able to
dispose of the risky asset at any time. The agent would keep the risky asset as
long as the expected profit of the asset and the cleared hedged position is above
zero, as follows:
π + (vA − vD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loss due to holding risky asset





Note that αD = vD and αA = vA, so that the vmgh cannot exceed L1(β∗) ≤ π. In
addition, if the agent leaves, the CCP can write down the initial margins γ also so
that the TC is satisfied whenever the following holds:
L1,e(β∗) ≤ π + γ
Combination of the Recovery Measures
Since the losses are allocated immediately, the initial margins γ can be counted
only once. The CCP can either call cash up to the size of the γ or write down
the initial margins up to γ, but it cannot do both. Combining either the cash call
or the initial margin write down with the vmgh, the CCP can achieve a complete
loss allocation. I obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Cash calls and initial margin write-downs are non-complementary
recovery measures. A combination of the variation margin haircut and the write-
down of initial margins or cash calls is complete as long as vD − β∗e < D + ε +
(N + 1)γ +N1(vD − vA).
As the following table shows, bringing de facto the initial margins into the CCP’s
loss allocation adds significant amounts of additional financial resources.
As shown, recovery measures enhance a CCP’s ability to allocate losses consid-
erably. I considered here only the willingness of the agents to continue meeting
their obligations but not their ability to do so. The losses that the CCP allocates
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CME LCH ICE
D 7′416 10′205 2′472
ε 250 84 50
(N + 1)γ 125′448 154′215 34′153
Table 2: Financial Resources of CCPs at Q42018, in USD Mio.
through the recovery measures described in this chapter affect the agents’ capital
and liquidity position almost immediately. The strength or vulnerability of a CCP
is, therefore, her clearing agents, who, in one way or another, will have to carry
the losses that go beyond the defaulting agent’s collateral (and a small layer of the
CCP’s capital).
7 Optimal Time of Auction
I will analyse whether a CCP can minimize her expected loss by choosing the
optimal time of the auction, as defined below.
Definition 4 The optimal time of auction A∗ ∈ [D + η, 1) given a complete loss
allocation 〈W(·),L(·)〉 minimizes the expected loss of the CCP in (1).
I will analyse the three cases of CCP’s expected loss depicted in equation (1) at





0 if vD − β(vĀ − 1) ≤ γ + δ
ε if vD − β(vĀ) ≥ γ + δ + ε
(0, ε) if xi ∈ [vĀ, vĀ − 1] where γ + δ < vD − β(xi) < γ + δ + ε
When at Ā, the CCP finds that vD − β(vĀ − 1) ≤ γ + δ, i.e., she does not expect
to lose her equity (first line), then the CCP will conduct the auction immediately.
In this case, A∗ = D + η.
However, if the CCP finds at Ā that vD − β(vĀ) > γ + δ, i.e., she expects to lose
her share of equity for sure when conducting an auction right away (second line),
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then by waiting, she cannot lose more if the price declines further but can gain if
the price rebounds. I do not calculate the optimal time A∗ explicitly but note that
the corresponding value vA∗ must satisfy in any case the following two inequalities
at the same time: vD − β(vA∗) < γ + δ + ε as well as vD − β(vA∗ − 1) > γ + δ.
Since it is not guaranteed that the price will rebound, the CCP will wait to hold
the auction until the price rebounds to value vA∗ or hold the position until t = 1.
If the CCP finds at Ā that the expected loss of her equity is neither zero nor her
full share ε, then she might decide to wait or conduct the auction right away. No
clear answer can be given in such a case.
Proposition 5 A CCP will conduct an auction at the earliest time possible Ā =
D+η when the corresponding value of the auctioned contract vĀ translates into no
expected loss of equity. If the value of the contract at Ā is such that she will lose
her entire share of equity ε for sure, then she prefers to wait until the price either
rebounds or hold the position until maturity.
The implication of a CCP holding the position for an extended period of time
for the surviving members is that all agents are indirectly exposed to the market
risk Bt and thus will carry cost ξi as expressed in equation (3). It can be argued
that the type 1 members are more heavily exposed than type 2 members since the
former would potentially be subject to vmgh in addition to potentially losing the
initial margin γ. The CCP will not internalize these costs because all participants
still weakly prefer to stay with the CCP. Crucially, this holds only for markets
subject to mandatory clearing. If mandatory clearing was not in place, then two
agents of opposite type could meet and agree to trade out of a CCP and hedge
their exposure towards Bt in a bilateral contract.
16
16This operation would require the agents to agree on two simultaneous transactions, as follows:
first, an opposite trade to the one described in section 3.2 would be submitted for clearing to the
CCP and, second, the same trade as described in section 3.2 would be agreed bilaterally.
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8 Additional Consideration
8.1 Auctions with a Subset of Bidders
CCPs have in the past conducted auctions with only a subset of agents.17 There-
fore, it is of practical relevance to analyse how this affects the invited and not
invited agents to the auction. I will analyse the situation where NA is the number
of agents invited to the auction but all agents N > NA are subject to the loss
allocation of the CCP. It can be shown (see the proof in the appendix) that the
payment of the winning bidder ZNA(xi) in such an auction is lower compared to
an auction where all bidders are invited, which has direct implications for the non-
invited agents who have to expect to share more losses. From this, the following
proposition follows.
Proposition 6 Inviting a subset of agents NA < N to the auction puts the non-
invited agents at a comparative disadvantage.
The benefits of increasing the number of agents participating in an auction crucially
depend on how good the CCP is at picking agents with low private costs (or with
a high private value). In this model, the CCP picks agents randomly. This is in
contrast to the situation where the CCP does not know the exact private costs ci
but is able to divide all agents into two groups, as follows: agents with low private
costs cli ∼ U [0, x] and agents with high private costs chi ∼ U [y, 1] . In the simple
case, where the support of the two groups does not intersect, i.e., x ≤ y (and
where there are at least two low private cost agents), it can be shown that inviting
the high cost agents to the auction will never improve the result and that the high
cost agents will be indifferent regarding whether to participate in the auction or
not.
The analysis can become very complicated when the support of the agents with low
and high private costs intersect. Vickrey [1961] already noted that asymmetries
among the bidders could lead to inefficient second-price auctions but noted that the
mathematics of this problem might become intractable. Since then, many authors
have tried to approach the problem from different angles. In addition to others,
17See, for example, a very well documented case of Lehman’s Default at CME in Valukas
[2010], p. 1841-1870.
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Maskin and Riley [2000] have studied the properties of first-price and second-price
auctions in the case of two asymmetric bidders whose stochastic values do not
necessarily share the same support. Only recently did Hubbard and Kirkegaard
[2015] extend the analysis to more than two bidders who do not have the same
value support. They show that the results deviate crucially from the case of two
bidders and extend the application to many additional relevant cases. Clearly, if
the assumption of the CCP not knowing the private values of the agent is relaxed
a bit, the results can change dramatically. Generally, it cannot be excluded that
CCPs have some insights into the private values of the agents. After all, CCPs
can observe the trading behaviour of the agents, their turnover, positions and so
forth.
8.2 Re-Establishing a Matched Book: Partial Tear-Up
Another recovery measure a CCP can take is to terminate some or all contracts to
return to a matched book and stem further losses (see CPMI-IOSCO [2017]). The
CCP would establish a (market) price to calculate payments due to the affected
surviving agents. If the available collateral is not sufficient, then the payments due
would be reduced pro rata. In this paper, I will consider the partial tear-up, where
the termination affects only those contracts necessary to offset the position of the
defaulting agent. The results can be immediately translated into the termination
of all the contracts of the CCP (complete tear-up).
The starting point is that the holding loss of the CCP is such that the available
financial resources are not sufficient, i.e., that vD − vA ≥ γ + D + ε, and that
the CCP would tear-up the contracts of the surviving agents unless the auction
provides a sufficiently high winning bid β∗, where vD − β∗ = γ +D+ ε. Contracts
once torn cannot be re-traded with another agent and the affected agent carries
costs ci since her risk is not fully hedged any longer. Is it desirable for the bidders
to avoid a tear-up? And if yes, can an auction achieve a desirable outcome?
A partial tear-up is economically equivalent to the variation margin haircut, i.e.,
the CCP would partially tear-up a fraction 1
N1
of each agent type 1 contract




.18 Given this, the CCP calls an auction and announces that po-
sitions will be partially torn and accordingly compensated if the winning bid β∗
falls below β∗ < vD − (γ +D + ε). The bidders are faced with the following three






xi − bi − δ if bi > b−i ∧ vD − bi = γ +D + ε
−δ if bi < b−i ∧ vD − b−i = γ +D + ε
−δ − (ci + L1) if vD − b∗ > γ +D + ε
(19)
The first two payoffs describe the situation where the winning bid is sufficiently
high to ensure that the CCP does not have to tear-up the positions. In the first
line, the bidder i wins and in the second line, some other bidder −i wins. The
third line displays the payoffs in case the bids are not sufficiently high and the
CCP would partially tear-up a fraction of each type 1’s contract. Note that type
1 agent i still occurs costs ci even though only a part of the contract was torn.
Do bidders have an incentive to provide bids as to avoid the tear-up?
To simplify the analysis, I consider the following reduced form in an example where
two type 1 bidders i and j face an auction (bidders of type 2 are not considered
here since they have no incentive to avoid a tear-up). They can either ”pay”
b = vD − (γ + D + ε) = vA + N1L1 and avoid the tear-up or ”not pay” (meaning
that they offer any price lower than b) and have their contracts torn. If both decide




Pay −ci − L1, −cj − h1 −ci − 2L1, 0
Not Pay 0, −cj − 2L1 −ci − h1, −cj − L1
Table 3: Payoff (δ not considered)
It is clear that all bidders prefer that someone else pays a high enough bid to avoid
18Each type 1 member would have a fraction 1N1 of its contract torn and instead of receiving
vA
N1





the tear- up. The payoff in Table 3 shows that there can be only one equilibrium,
i.e., both do not pay. Both would be equally well off if both paid or if none paid,
but in the situation where both pay, each bidder has an incentive to deviate and
not pay. Therefore, the bidders do not provide higher bids even if the partial
tear-up is at risk.
The result of this game can be understood better if the variables are given concrete
values. Consider the case where each type 1 would receive L1 = −1 less compen-
sation for the share of torn contract and where ci = 0 and cj = 1 in table 4. From
an aggregated point of view, the losses would be lowest if i pays and j does not
pay since agent i has the lowest cost of storing another contract. In fact, agent
j could compensate i and still be better off. Such an outcome could be achieved
if the CCP would, instead of facing the bidders with a tear-up, consider covering





Pay −1, −2 −2, 0
Not Pay 0, −3 −1, −2
Table 4: Payoff with concrete values
In case of a full tear-up, all bidders would lose their positions, including those who
were not affected by the default of the clearing member. The payoff in equation
(19) now applies to all bidders (i.e., including the brackets), and it is easy to show
that in this case, none of the bidders have an incentive to bid higher and avoid a
full tear-up. The following proposition, therefore, holds for any type of tear-up.
Proposition 7 Tear-ups are more costly on an aggregate basis compared to other
recovery measures. Although agents would weakly prefer to share the losses instead
of avoid having contracts torn-up, an auction cannot achieve the desirable outcome.
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9 Conclusions
In this paper, I formalize the incentives of a CCP and the surviving clearing
agents in an auction conducted by the CCP when one agent defaults. I show that
incentives (for example simple forms of juniorisation of default fund contributions)
increase the overall bidding price but that this does not affect either the CCP’s
or the surviving agent’s profits. In other words, even though clearing agents offer
higher prices, less of their own default fund contributions will be deducted. The
overall effect nets to zero.
A complete loss allocation can incentivise CCPs in certain instances to wait rather
than quickly conduct an auction. This is for example the case in situations, where
all size of losses are covered by the surviving agents by way of cash calls, use of
initial margins, or variation margin haircuts. This can inflict costs on the financial
system and has implications for the governance structure of a CCP. Far reaching
decisions by a CCP, for example, the time of an auction, should incorporate the
interests of the clearing agents.
Auction theory shows that having more agents participating in an auction increases
competition and bidding prices. Conducting CCP auctions with a subset of agents
has distributional implications too, where the invited agents are better off than
those not invited to the auction. This applies, for example, to clients who might
be subject to the loss allocation in the case of variation margin haircuts. Having
more agents participate in an auction will not only raise the average winning bid
but alleviate distributional issues.
Finally, I show, that tearing-up of contracts is an expensive recovery measure
compared to other alternatives and that the threat of a tear-up does not coordinate
agents sufficiently to bid higher prices to avoid the tear-up in the first place. CCP’s
should not rely on tear-ups as an incentive but use it only as a measure of last
resort.
I have taken the size of the financial resources (e.g., default fund, initial margins,
CCP’s equity) as well as the default waterfall as given. Further research could
build on this and frame the auction as a broader design problem that includes the
optimal size of the financial resources provided by the clearing agents, the CCP as
well as the order of the financial resources to be used.
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Proofs
Optimal Bidding: Somebody Else Pays
Suppose that bidders j 6= i follow the symmetric, increasing, and differentiable equi-
librium bidding strategy β and that bidder i receives a signal that its private value is
xi = vA − ci and bids b. In the following, I want to determine the optimal b.
The upper and lower limits of the optimal bid can be defined as follows. First, it is never
optimal to bid b > β(vA) since bidder i would definitely win and can always do better
by reducing its bid, and I will consider only bids b ≤ β(vA). Second, a bidder with value
x = vA−1 would never submit a bit that is higher than its private value since she would
take a loss if she wins. If she bids lower, then she will definitely lose, and the profit is
zero. Thus, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid β(vA − 1) = vA − 1.







xi) and, thus, bidder i wins whenever b > β(max
j 6=i
xi),
or whenever β−1(b) > max
j 6=i
xi. The expected profit of a bidder is therefore as follows:
π(x, b) = G(β−1(b))(xi − b)
Maximizing w.r.t. b yields the following first-order condition where G′ = g is the density
of the highest value, as follows:
g(β−1(b)
β′(β−1(b))
(x− b)−G(β−1(b)) = 0
At a symmetric equilibrium b = β(x) and the equation above can be simplified as follows
(the second expression is equivalent to the first one):

























The first-order condition is a necessary but not sufficient condition. I refer to Krishna
[2010] for the last part of the proof.
Optimal Bidding: Equal Loss Allocation
Inserting the risk-sharing function fe(·) = f(·) = h(·) into equation (3) I obtain the
following:
πe(xi, b) = G(β
−1
















At a symmetric equilibrium b = βe(xi) the equation can be written as follows:
G(xi)β
′(xi)(1 + f ′e(βe(xi))) + g(xi)β(x) = xig(xi)
After entering the respective values for G(xi) = (xi − (vA − 1))N−1 and g(xi) = (N −




β(xi) = xi, for which the solution is as follows:
βe(x) =
N − 1
N + f ′e
x+
1 + f ′e
N + f ′e
(vA − 1)
There is no constant since it is weakly optimal for the bidder with private value vA−1 to









Optimal Bidding: Losers Loss Allocation
Inserting the risk-sharing function fw(·) = 0 and hw(·) into equation (3) I obtain the
following:
πw(xi, b) = G(β
−1
















At a symmetric equilibrium b = βw(x) and by simplifying hw = hw(βw(x)), the above
equation can be expressed as follows (the second line is a reformulation of the first):
G(xi)β
′
w(xi) + g(xi)(βw(xi)− hw) = xig(xi)
d
dx
G(xi)(βw(xi)− hw) = xig(xi)−G(xi)h′w








Integrating by parts (where
∫
uv′ = [uv] −
∫




NG(xi)(xi − (vA − 1)), as well as h′′w = 0, I obtain the following:
G(xi)(βw(xi)− hw) = xiG(xi)−
1
N
G(xi)(xi − (vA − 1))− h′w
1
N
G(xi)(xi − (vA − 1))
Finally, by re-arranging the expression, I obtain the following:
βw(x) =





(vA − 1) + hw
Note that this time, it is not weakly dominant for a bidder with private value vA − 1 to
bid its own value. Imagine a bidder with private value vA− 1 + ε, where ε is very small.
If it wins, it does not have to pay hw, but if it loses (which is very likely), if will have
to pay hw anyway. If it bids its own value, then another bidder close but with a slightly
lower private value could increase its chances of winning by bidding slightly more than
its own private value. Therefore, it cannot be an equilibrium.
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For a concrete risk-sharing function hw(βw(xi)) =
(vD−βw(xi))−(γ+δ)








(vA − 1) +
vD − (γ + δ)
N
Optimal Bidding: Overlapping Losses
The bidder whose bid is above the critical value b ≥ σ knows that the default fund will
not be used and has to solve a maximization problem expressed by equation (15). The




Since βD(ζ) = σ, I have that for any optimal bid above σ (i.e., where only the defaulter’s










































(vA − 1) +
1
N(N + 1)
(ζ − (vA − 1))N
(xi − (vA − 1))N−1
Comparison of the Loss Allocation Arrangements
Somebody Else Pays
The expected profit of a bidder with private value xi in the case where someone else




N (vA − 1) and where
l(xi) = 0 is as follows:










(xi − (vA − 1))N
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Equal Loss Allocation
The expected payoff of a bidder with private value xi in the case where some bidders





and the respective loss allocation function is:






N . The expression is more complicated, and I will
calculate both parts separately. The first part can be calculated in two different ways,
as follows:









xi − (vA − 1)
)N−1 vD − βe(x)− (γ + δ)
N








(vA + 1)− vD + (γ + δ)
)
= Υ

























y − (vA − 1)
)N−1(vD − (γ + δ)
N − 1 − 2
vA − 1









y − (vA − 1)
)N−1(
vD − (γ + δ)− 2
vA − 1
N + 1
































vD− (γ+ δ)−2vA−1N+1 −xi N−1N+1
)
. After combining both










where Υ + Ψ =
(













xi − (vA − 1)
)N















The expected payoff of a bidder with private value xi in the case where default fund




N(N+1)(vA − 1) +
vD−(γ+δ)
N is as follows:






N−1 . It can be shown that πw(xi) = πe(xi),∀xi, i.e., that
the expected profit is the same for participants for both the equal sharing and the se-
niorization of the default fund.
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
First, I will show that the expected as well as the ex-ante profit of the bidders is not
affected by the loss allocation when bidders have to pay. In the second part, I will show
that the CCP’s expected profit is not affected either.
Independence of the Bidders’ Profit
Define Z(bi) = bi+f(bi) as the payment that bidder i providing bid bi would need to pay






xi − Z(bi) if bi > b−i = max bj 6=i
−h(b−i) if bi < b−i
Since the budget constraint in equation (5) must be satisfied for all possible winning






vD − (γ + δ + ε)− Z(b−i)
)
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xi − Z(bi) if bi > b−i = max bj 6=i
− 1N−1
(
vD − (γ + δ + ε)− Z(b−i)
)
if bi < b−i
Given that the other bidders follow the symmetric, increasing, and differentiable equilib-
rium strategy β, bidder i with the above payoff maximizes the following expected profit
by choosing the optimal bid bi, as follows:







vD − (γ + δ + ε)− Z(β(y))
)
dG(y)
where G(y) = F (y)N−1 denotes the distribution of the highest order statistics of the
remaining N − 1 bidders that bidder i is competing against.
Differentiating w.r.t. bi (using the Leibnitz Rule for the integral) yields the following
first-order condition, where G′ = g is the density of the highest order statistics (note











which can be simplified as follows (note, that Z ′(bi) = (1 + f ′(bi)):
N
N − 1g(β
−1(bi))Z(bi))+G(β−1(bi))β′(β−1(bi))(1+f ′(bi)) = g(β−1(bi))(xi+
vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N − 1 )
At symmetric equilibrium bi = β(xi), the first-order differential equation can be written
as follows (note that Z ′(β(xi)) = β′(xi)(1 + f ′(β(xi)))):
N
N − 1g(xi)Z(β(xi))) +G(xi)Z
′(β(xi)) = g(xi)(xi +
vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N − 1 )
Since Z(β(xi))) = β(xi) + f(β(xi)) only depends on xi, I can replace it with Ẑ(xi) =
Z(β(xi))), as follows:
N
N − 1g(xi)Ẑ(xi) +G(xi)Ẑ
′(xi) = g(xi)(xi +
vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N − 1 )
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vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N
, where c1 = 0
which proves that the payment that the winning bidder pays to the CCP is independent
of the loss allocation arrangement.
Finally, the expected profit π(xi) as well as the ex post payment can be expressed in
terms of Ẑ(xi), which finalizes the proof.
Independence of the CCP’s Profit
Take the expected loss of a CCP as expressed in equation (1). The first two cases are
not interesting since the expected loss is either zero or the complete share of equity ε
will be lost. Therefore, I will show that in the third case, where LCCP ∈ (0, ε), the loss
allocation cannot affect the expected loss of a CCP.
Consider any possible loss allocation function 〈Ŵ, L̂〉 leading to the optimal bidding
strategy β̂, and where β̂(ζ) = vD − (γ + δ + ε) with ζ ∈ (vA − 1, vA), i.e., there is a bid
that exactly exhausts all the defaulting agent’s collateral as well as the CCP’s share of
equity. According to the contractual arrangements for any loss allocation measures, it
must be that Ŵ(ζ) = L̂(ζ) = 0, and so inserting this into the above solution for Ẑ(ζ)
leads to the following:






(vA − 1) +
β̂(ζ)
N








which is the solution for the optimal bidding strategy in the case of equal loss allocation,
i.e., all loss allocation functions converge to point A in figure (2). Any bidding above
β̂(ζ) follows the same pattern, independent of the loss allocation function. From that, it
follows that the expected loss LCCP cannot be affected by the loss allocation function.
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Proof of Proposition 3
First, I will show that including agents not subject to the loss allocation increases the
optimal bidding strategy for both, including for those subject to the loss allocation.
Second, I will show that this reduces the CCP’s expected losses and, finally, I show that
the losers’ ex ante losses will also be lower as a result.
Adding agents not subject to the loss allocation
Add to the N agents subject to the loss allocation 〈W(·),L(·)〉 S agents who are not.
Given winning bid β∗, the CCP’s budget condition must satisfy one of two cases, as
follows: either an agent N wins or where an agent S wins. In the case of an equal
sharing function We(·), the budget constraint will always be the same, as follows:
(vD − β∗)− (γ + δ + ε) = NWe(β∗)
Given an equal sharing loss We(·), the first group of N agents choose bN to maximize
the following expected profit:
πN (xi, bN ) = F (β
−1
N (bN ))
(N−1)F (β−1S (bN ))










where F (y) = (y − (vA − 1)).
The second group of S agents maximize the following expected profit:





The first-order condition of the N agent subject to loss allocation can be written as









SF (β−1N (bN ))






(x′i − bN )
= F (β−1N (bN ))
(N−1)F (β−1S (bN ))
S(1 +W ′e(bN ))(
















(x′i − βN (x′i))
= F (x′i)
(N−1)F (β−1S (βN (x
′
i)))
S(1 +W ′e(βN (x′i)))
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Additionally, the first-order condition of the S agents not subject to the loss allocation





























= F (β−1N (βS(xi)))
NF (xi)
(S−1)
Assuming that βN (xi) ≥ βN (xi), I define x′i = β−1N (βS(xi)) so that βN (x′i) = βS(xi) and
so that it follows x′i ≤ xi. The first-order conditions of both types can be rewritten as
follows:
(









(x′i − βN (x′i))
= F (x′i)




























+ (N − 1)F (x′i)(N−2)
)












+ (S − 1)F (xi)(S−2)
)
(xi − βS(xi)) = F (xi)(S−1)β′S(xi)
(21)
Setting N = S = A and taking a ration of these two FOCs and after some reformulations
I obtain the following:
A− 1
A
(xi − βS(xi)) = (x′i − βN (x′i))
Which proves that βS(xi) 6= βN (xi) and, for an increasing equilibrium bidding strategy,
that βN (xi) > βS(xi).
A comparison of the first condition in (21) to the first-order condition when N agents
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subject to the equal loss allocation are bidding on their own in equation (10) reveals
that the agent is subject to a loss allocation bid at least as high when the group which
is not subject to loss allocation is added.
Reduce the CCP’s expected losses
Strategy of proof: just show for one example how losses will be lower, concentrate thereby
on the β where all do not expect to pay.
Lower ex ante losses
Proof-Strategy: There are two possible outcomes. Either someone subject to the loss
allocation wins or someone not subject to the loss allocation wins. Simply show for both
cases that the ex-ante loss of the losers will be lower in both cases compared to where
only agents subject to the loss allocation participate in the auction.
Proof of Proposition 4
I need to show that the participation constraint is always satisfied and that the termi-
nation constraint is always satisfied whenever the payment of the loser is lower than the
maximal losses the CCP can inflict on the leaving agent.
Participation constraint
The expected loss when not participating in equation (6) can be calculated for all loss











(vA − 1) +
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The expected profit for any loss allocation arrangement in equation (17) is replicated















so that it is easy to show that the inequality always holds since the expected profit
for any loss allocation is at least as large as the losses that the CCP can inflict on the
non-participating agent.
Termination constraint
For which bidder / loser combination is the termination constraint (7) most limiting?
First, given the winning bid β∗(xi), then the termination constraint is most limiting
where the losers have private costs very close to the winning bidder, i.e., lim c−i → ci.
Second, given that c−i = ci, then the termination constraint is most limiting where the
winner has a private cost of zero, i.e., ci = 0 because






(vA − 1) +
vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N
− ci
is highest for ci = 0.
Therefore, the TC will never be violated when I can show that Lβ(vA) ≤ l.
Proof of Proposition 6
For NA < N participating in the auction but all N agents being subject to the loss
allocation, the budget constraint of the CCP is as follows:




The first-order conditions can be easily derived from equation (4), as follows:
N


















(vA − 1) +








(vA − 1) +
vD − (γ + δ + ε)
N
Relating this to equation (17), it can be shown that ZNA(xi) < Z(xi) and LNA(xi) >
L(xi) for NA < N , so the profit of the invited agents is always larger:
πNA(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸






expected profit of non-invited agents
for xi > vA − 1
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When contracts are nonexclusive, agents might find it profitable to trade too
many contracts, exert low levels of effort and subsequently default. I show that
collateral solves this moral hazard problem. However, due to collateral costs and
positive externalities, trades in bilateral clearing are mostly uncollateralized. Con-
tractual innovations (e.g. termination clause) cannot solve this moral hazard prob-
lem. I show that a CCP deals with the moral hazard problem by setting position
limits but that this does do not work when CCPs compete for markets. Regulatory
minimum collateral requirements are most robust and effective measure to over-
come such moral hazard problems.
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1 Introduction
In derivatives markets, a distinction is often made between exchange-traded and
over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Exchange-traded derivative markets are typi-
cally well regulated, trade in standardized and liquid contracts that are subse-
quently cleared by central counterparties (CCPs) subject to strict collateral rules.
Whereas OTC derivatives markets trade in customized but illiquid contracts with
varying levels of collateral to protect against default, generally subject to lower
levels of regulation. In this setting, the size of OTC derivatives markets have
grown rapidly in the run up to the financial crisis in 2008 and regulators have
voiced concern with regards to how these risk are managed, including the low level
of collateral posted to protect against counterparty risk (see for example CPSS
[2007]). But it was only during the financial crisis that the full extent of the risks
involved and their contagious effect was exposed.
In order to reduce systemic risks in the OTC derivatives markets, the G20 an-
nounced in 2009 that standardized OTC derivative contracts should be cleared
through central counterparties (CCPs).1 As a result, regulators across the globe
started to mandate financial institutions to use CCPs for OTC markets that are
deemed sufficiently standardized. At the same time, since 2016 rules are currently
being phased-in requiring stricter margin requirements for non-cleared derivatives.
These measures not only aim at making derivatives markets more safe but they are
designed to explicitly incentivise CCP clearing (FSB-BIS-CPMI-IOSCO [2018]).
With this regulatory push to promote CCP clearing, a new distinction for deriva-
tives markets emerges, namely between those derivatives markets cleared by CCPs
and those not cleared by CCPs (bilateral clearing). From today’s perspective,
CCPs can be easily seen as constructions invented and promoted by regulators.
However, it was the market participants that more than hundred years ago founded
1G20 Leaders agreed in September 2009 that: “All standardised OTC derivative contracts
should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared
through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be
reported to trade repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital
requirements. We ask the FSB and its relevant members to assess regularly implementation and
whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic
risk, and protect against market abuse.”
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the first entity resembling today’s CCPs.2 Currently, most of the CCPs that op-
erate and clear a wide range of derivative and cash markets have mostly been
founded by market participants to manage risks and improve settlement before
regulatory requirements became an important driving force. That includes half a
dozen CCPs that possess substantial fiancial resources and centrally clear impor-
tant global financial markets3, as well as dozens of CCPs that are important on a
national or regional level.
Given that CCP and bilateral clearing will continue to exist side-by-side, this pa-
per aims to study derivatives markets where (risk-averse) agents have the choice to
trade contracts with risk neutral counterparties (banks) through a CCP (with strict
collateral requirements) or clear them bilaterally where the collateral requirements
can be negotiated, i.e. in a sense there is not only competition between CCPs but
between CCPs and bilateral clearing. An important feature of the model is that
without collateral, the agents cannot control the size of positions taken by the
bank, i.e. where financial contracts are non-exclusive and that the bank’s likeli-
hood of default is endogenously defined by the size of the position.
In bilateral clearing, the agent thus faces a trade-off between charging costly collat-
eral to manage the risk of nonperformance. In CCP clearing this task is delegated
to the CCP.
I proceed by starting with a simple setting and then extend the model step-by-
step. The first result in the paper is that if the agent was able to impose exclusivity
in bilateral clearing, she would prefer a contract without charging any collateral,
given that default-risk of the bank is low enough, the opportunity cost of collateral
high or the risk-aversion of the agent sufficiently low.
However, if nonexclusivity of contracts is assumed, then I show that in big markets
(i.e. in markets where banks have the opportunity to trade many contracts) the
agent would need to charge high margins to avoid that the bank signs too many
contracts. But charging collateral exhibits positive externalities and there might
be no market. Namely, if all agents charge collateral, then a single agent can safely
2See for example Vuillemey [2020] who discusses the creation of the Caisse de Liquidation des
Affaires en Marchandises in the market for coffee futures in Le Havre (France) in 1882.
3For example, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, ICE Clear, LCH, Eurex Clearing, Japan Se-
curities Clearing Corporation, the Options Clearing Coprporation, and Fixed Income Clearing
Corporation
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deviate and not charge collateral at all in the knowledge that the bank cannot and
will not sign too many contracts.
In an extension of the bilateral clearing model, I show that contractual innova-
tions like termination clauses proposed for example by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) can extend the market size where it is safe to
trade contracts without collateral, but at some point charging collateral becomes
inevitable.
At this point CCPs enter the stage. Due to risk pooling they can offer a default-
free contract for less collateral. But this is not the only advantage a CCP can
offer. Given that all agents choose to clear through a sole CCP, the CCP is in a
position to set trading limits for banks and thus limit the moral hazard problem
of signing too many contracts too. CCP clearing, however, does not always form
an equilibrium for two reasons. The first reason is competition between CCPs. If
more then one CCP is active in a market, then banks can circumvent the limits
that CCPs set and exhibit higher rates of default. The second reason are deviating
agents. If the opportunity costs of collateral is too high, agents might still prefer
to clear bilaterally without collateral and deviate if all other agents clear with a
CCP.
CCPs have tried to solve this issue by implicitly imposing mandatory clearing for
certain liquid (and thus big) markets and allowing only one CCP to do the clearing,
e.g. it is not possible to trade on a derivative market without using the dedicated
CCP which in many cases is an integral part of the exchange market. However,
this strategy might not work for contracts that are traded at many marketplaces
globally where it is difficult to impose de-facto mandatory clearing or where com-
petition between CCPs in different jurisdictions allow banks to distribute their
contracts.
Another situation where self-organized mandatory clearing with one CCP is diffi-
cult to impose is in markets which have grown from small to a big in a relatively
short time frame. In such cases the market participants might not react quickly
enough and establish market practices or even set up a CCP taking into account
the growing importance and market size. This has arguably happened in the mar-
ket for credit default swaps (CDS) which has rapidly grown in a few years and
CCPs were set up only after AIG reported massive losses on CDS positions that
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lead to the bailout of the company (see for example Arora et al. [2012] for a discus-
sion of a discussion of the CDS market). In contrast, LCH launched in 1999 a CCP
for interest rate swaps (IRS) with wide support from global banks, covering by the
end of 2006 around 40% of the global inter-dealer IRS market (CPSS [2007]).
Finally, I show that collateral discourages banks from trading too many contracts,
encourages the bank to exert high levels of effort, and ensures that the obligations
are always met. But collateral exhibits positive externalities and is costly, there-
fore even risk-averse agents would prefer not to use it. I show that contractual
innovations (e.g. termination clauses) do not mimic the function of collateral sat-
isfactorily and cannot solve the moral hazard issue. Regulation requiring agents
to exchange minimum levels of collateral helps to overcome this problem.
Related Literature
The analysis of competition between multiple exchanges has brought forward sev-
eral modeling frameworks. Santos and Scheinkman [2001a] consider whether com-
petition among exchanges lead to excessively low standards. They show in a
framework where exchanges design contracts and which allows for the default of
the trader but not for them to trade in multiple markets that the use of collateral
can lead to a constrained efficient outcome. However, in Santos and Scheinkman
[2001b] they note, that under nonexclusivity the equilibrium might not hold any
more. Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] consider competitive equilibria where agents trade
in standardized markets non-exclusive contracts under a wide set of asymmetric
information. They show that two prices (a bid and ask price) and a ’pooling’
asset are enough for a competitive equilibrium to exist, i.e. when markets are
sufficiently complete. The pooling asset is a security whose payoff is the average
total net amount due to agents who traded the contract. In this paper, I do not
assume that markets are sufficiently complete but allow agents to trade incomplete
contracts. This setup gives rise to innovating CCPs who not only can limit the
amount of trades that banks execute but offer default-free contracts.
The study of non-exclusive contracts is usually combined with some form of moral
hazard behaviour. For example Bizer and DeMarzo [1992] study environments
where agents borrow sequentially from more than one lender, and so the borrower
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has an incentive to approach more than one banks for further borrowing. This non-
exclusivity is discussed by Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] study equilibria for economies
characterized by moral hazard (hidden action) and non-exclusive contracts. This
paper borrowed several modelling aspects from these two papers. Unlike in these
two papers, where the risk-averse agent is subject to moral hazard, in my paper it
is the risk-neutral agent who is subject to moral hazard.
More generally, the literature on central clearing has grown rapidly following the
financial crisis of 2008. One branch of study focuses on the systemic aspect of CCP
clearing by comparing counterparty risks in an environment where financial con-
tracts are netted bilaterally between financial institutions (bilateral clearing) with
the situation where CCPs allow for multilateral netting of traded financial con-
tracts (central clearing). For example, Duffie and Zhu [2011], Cont and Kokholm
[2014], and Lewandowska [2015] analyse whether central clearing can reduce coun-
terparty risks compared to bilateral clearing. Another branch of papers focuses
on the disincentives present in markets cleared by CCPs. Huang [2019], for ex-
ample, assesses the appropriate size of collateral and equity from the viewpoint of
a profit-oriented CCP subject to limited liability or Bignon and Vuillemey [2017]
show, based on historical empirical evidence, that CCPs might have in the past
delayed declaring an agent into default and in hopes of a resurrection. Other pa-
pers (for example Angelo et al. [2019] or Arora et al. [2012]) analyse the effects
of mandating CCP clearing on interest rates or credit markets. In this paper,
following Biais et al. [2016] I model the CCP as an entity that pools risks and
sets collateral to guarantee default-free contracts. The trading game in this paper
is inspired by Leitner [2012] who proposes a central mechanism that sets position
limits and reveals the names of agents who hit these limits and so disciplines agents
not to sign too many contracts. In my paper I go one step futher and consider
environments where there is more than one CCP.
2 The Basic Model
There are two periods. The economy is populated by a continuum of risk-averse
agents and risk-neutral banks. The agents are endowed with one unit of an identi-
cal, illiquid, risky asset yielding a publicly observable stochastic return R at t = 1.
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The banks are endowed with one unit of wealth which they can invest at t = 0
into a risky asset paying a privately observable stochastic return θ at t = 1 or
into a safe asset (cash) yielding zero return. If the bank invests into the risky
asset she can affect her return privately by choosing high or low effort e ∈ {a, b}.
Agents can enter at t = 0 nonexclusive state-contingent contracts with banks for
insurance purpose, i.e. agents cannot control with how many other agents a bank
signs a contract. Banks are protected by limited liability.
2.1 Preferences and Technology
The utility of the agents is given by function u, where u′′ < 0. The agents cannot
influence the return of their assets which depend on the state of the economy and
can take two values RH > RL with ∆R = RH − RL = 1, and where p = 12 is
the probability of high return. The outcome of R is public information. RH can
be interpreted as the outcome of a good state of the economy and RL as the bad








Each bank can invest her one unit of wealth in period 0 either into a riskless asset
with zero net return (i.e. cash) or into a risky asset with random return θ that is
i.i.d. across banks, whose realization is only privately observable, and takes two
values 1.5 > θH > 1 and θL = 0.
4 The bank can take action e that affects the
probability distribution of the investment into the risky asset. The action taken
at t = 0 can take two values e ∈ {a, b}, is only privately observable, and taking
action e carries dis-utility Ce = (e− b) for the bank. For simplicity, I assume that
the action equals the probability of the good outcome, and that action a is the
high effort action, where 1 > a > b > 0.5. The expected utility of a bank which
has invested the share α ∈ [0, 1] of her wealth into the riskless asset and a share
4I allow the high return θH to be within a certain range only. This limits the number of
possible solutions without affecting the main results of the paper. Assuming that a return is
lower than 50% is in any case not a very limiting assumption.
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(1− α) of her wealth into the risky asset and taken action e is:
π(α, e) = α + (1− α)(θHe− Ce)
Note, that the asset under management and the dis-utility are connected: if the
bank invests only a share (1 − α) of her wealth into the risky asset then the dis-
utility only applies to this part of the investment (i.e. keeping assets in cash does
not cost any effort). Ce enters as dis-utility for the bank only: it does not diminish
the capital that can be invested, nor the resources available to transfers to the
agents.
The values have been set so as to simplify often used expressions and the final
results: First, the expected return in case of low effort is defined to be θHb = 1.
Second, I define re = θHe− 1−Ce where re represents the expected net return on
the risky asset after discounting for the dis-utility connected to action e. Based




2.2 Market for State-Contingent Contracts
The agent knows the banks technology consisting of choice e but cannot observe
the level of effort. The number of contracts a bank has signed or will sign in future
cannot be observed by the agent either. The agent may enter into a standard swap
contract with one bank at t = 0. The contract consists of 〈F, α〉 specifying the
swap rate F and the collateral α that the bank must place in an escrow account
and cannot use for investment purposes.5 The contract implies that the agent
expects to receive a transfer F − RH < 0 in the good state of the economy or
F − RL > 0 in the bad state of the economy, thus a positive transfer indicates a
transfer from the bank to the agent and vice-versa.
I allow the collateral to take two values {0, F − RL}, i.e. the agent can either
decide not to collateralize the trade or to fully collateralize it.6 The collateral can
5The contract will not be contingent on the return θ of the bank. This is because it is difficult
or impossible for the agent to monitor the return of the bank.
6Note, that I restrict the contract on two accounts. First, I allow only a standard swap
contract to be written, instead of allowing the agent to fix different transfers for all four possible
states of the economy and second, I allow the collateral to take two values only. Both limitations
simplify the results but do not affect the general results presented in this paper.
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be accessed by the agent only if the bank does not fulfill its contractual obligations.
If all contractual obligations are fulfilled, the collateral will be returned to the bank
in period 1. The bank is protected by limited liability and therefore the maximum
amount she can transfer at any state of the world to the agent is limited by what
is tangible. I assume that the bank does not suffer any penalty (other than losing
her collateral placed in the escrow account) if she defaults on her contractual
obligations.
2.3 The Trading Game
The following trading game is based on Leitner [2012] but includes some additional
elements. At t = 0 there are N trading rounds. In the first trading round a fraction
1
N
of agents and of banks are chosen randomly to enter the market. The agent
proposes a state-contingent contract and the bank can accept or reject. If the
agent’s contract has been accepted she will exit the market or else stay for the
next round.7 However, agents do not know in which round they are in.
A bank however, can stay in the market for the next round even if she accepted
a contract. In the next round a new bank can only enter if one bank from the
preceding period has left. This means that the banks which have randomly been
chosen in the first round can stay in the market for up to N trading rounds and
sign N contracts with N different agents. N can be interpreted as the size of the
market.
Once a bank has accepted n ≤ N contracts and left the market she invests all
remaining wealth (1−nα) into the risky asset θ and chooses the effort e she wants
to apply.8
2.4 Definition of an Equilibrium
The outcome of the game is defined by 〈n, F, α, e〉. Given such an outcome in
period 1, the utility to the bank that has accepted n contracts and invested is
7In equilibrium, agents will propose a contract which the bank will always accept and thus
agents will stay only for one round.
8I will not allow the bank to consume wealth (1− nα) in period 0. The bank can only invest
into the risky or riskless asset.
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π(n, F, α, e) = E[
(
nα + (1 − nα)θe − n(F − R)
)+
] − (1 − nα)Ce. In contrast,
banks that have signed no contract have an expected utility of π(0, 0, a) = θHa−
Ca. The agent’s utility can be expressed as U(R,F ) = E[u(R + min(F − R,α +
(1−nα)θ
n
)] consisting of the return of the risky asset and the contractual transfer,
respectively if the bank is unable to fulfill her contractual agreements, then the
agents receive the collateral and share the proceeds from the investment. Thus,
the actual transfer consists of either the agreed transfer F − R or, if the bank
has not sufficient resources, the agent receives the collateral and a share of any
remaining resources.
A strategy for a bank is a policy defining which set of transfer contracts 〈F, α〉 she
is willing to accept for how many rounds n, together with associated investment
and effort choices e. A strategy for an agent is a set of transfer contracts 〈F, α〉
she is willing to propose.
In equilibrium, the policy of each bank should maximize profits given the strategy
of the agent, and the strategy of the agent should maximize utility given the banks’
policies. I will apply the concept of subgame-perfect equilibria in order to rule out
non-credible strategies. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, a bank accepts only
transfer contracts that earn profits at least as good as not accepting a contract.
Profits on a transfer contract depend on the effort of the bank, which is not known
to the agent. From a subgame perfection, the bank always chooses effort optimally
given the transfer contract.
To better organize and present the results, I will first discuss the well-known case
where contractual relationship are exclusive and one bank contracts with one agent
only (N = 1). I will then move to the case where the agent cannot condition the
transfer contract to the bank’s other contractual obligations, i.e. where contractual
relationships are nonexclusive and the bank can negotiate contracts bilaterally with
several agents. Further, I will analyze the situation, where a central counterparty
interposes itself between agent and bank and guarantees the performance of the
contract. Finally, I allow bilateral and CCP clearing to exist side-by-side and
analyze the implications for trading equilibria.
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3 Exclusive Contracts
The contractual relationship between an agent and a bank is exclusive in the sense
that the bank as well as the agent can write only one contract. I will first formally
describe the problem solved by the bank and the agent, define of the equilibrium,
discuss it and relate it to derivative markets.
3.1 Maximization problem of banks and agents
Given that the bank accepts the contract 〈F, α〉 proposed by the agent she chooses
the optimal action e ∈ {a, b} to maximize
π(F, α, e) = E[
(
α + (1− α)θe− (F −R)
)+
]− Ce (1)
Equation (1) contains two elements: limited liability and moral hazard which I
will discuss each in turn.
Limited liability requires that the transfers τH = F −RH and τL = F −RL satisfy
the following four inequalities:
(RH , θH) : α + (1− α)θH −τH ≥ 0
(RH , θL) : α −τH ≥ 0
(RL, θH) : α + (1− α)θH −τL ≥ 0
(RL, θL) : α −τL ≥ 0
Since the agent prefers to receive payments if her return is low RL (i.e. τL > 0)
and transfer payments to the bank in case of high return RH (i.e. τH < 0) limited
liability in the first two cases does not bind. In the third case, limited liability can
bind, if return θH is too small compared to the required transfer τL or if the share
of collateral α is too high, so that the bank does not have sufficient resources to
invest into high-yielding projects. In the fourth case limited liability always binds.
Moral hazard with transfer contract occurs when the bank prefers to exhibit low
effort b instead of high effort a after signing a transfer contract. A necessary
condition to avoid moral hazard (i.e. to ensure that the bank prefers to exhibit
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high effort e = a even after signing transfer contract) is:
1
2
(τL − α) ≤ (1− α)(θH − 1) (2)
The incentive constraint binds before the resource constraint in case of (RL, θH)
binds.9 That means whenever the bank finds it optimal to exhibit high effort
e = a the resource constraint in case of (RL, θH) does not bind. The incentive
constraint never binds in case of full collateralization because the left-hand side is
by definition zero. This is an important statement since it means that in case of
full collateralization the agent not only ensures that she will always be paid but
that it is always in the interest of the bank to exert high effort.
The agent proposes contract 〈F, α〉 to maximize
U(R,F ) (3)
subject to
π(F, α, e) ≥ π(0, 0, a) (4)
−R ≤ τR ≤ α + (1− α)θ, ∀ R, θ (5)
e solve (1) (6)
The participation constraint in equation (4) requires that the bank accepting the
contract is at least as well off with the contract compared to not having the contract
at all. The resource constraint in equation (5) incorporates the limited liability
of the bank (rhs) as well as the limited resources that the agent can transfer to
the bank (lhs). The lhs of the equation never binds, i.e. the agent will never
propose a contract, where she will transfer to the bank all her returns. As to
the rhs of the equation: In the exclusive world, the agent will need to resolve the
trade-off between charging costly collateral α and accepting lower (or no) transfer
in case both the investment of the bank and of the agent turn bad (i.e. RL, θL).
Finally, (6) accounts for the interdependency between the agent’s and the bank’s
9To see this, compare the incentive constraint 12 (τL −α) ≤ (1−α)(θH − 1) with the resource
constraint α + (1 − α)θH − τL ≥ 0 in case of (RL, θH). After some reformulations I can show
that 2(θH − 1) > θH (because θH < 1.5) which proves that the IC binds first.
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maximization problem: A contract, if accepted, can affect the level of effort of the
bank, which in turn has an effect on the utility of the agent. I will refer to it as
the incentive constraint.
3.2 Equilibrium: Definition and Results
The following definition of the equilibrium is standard and has already been used
for example by Bisin and Guaitoli [2004] and others:
Definition 1 An exclusive contract equilibrium is an array 〈F, α, e〉 such that e
maximize (1) given 〈F, α〉 and 〈F, α〉 maximize (3) subject to (4)-(6).
I will now discuss the solution to the incentive unconstrained problem. The fol-
lowing results and the analysis are graphically illustrated.





















and where the optimal level of collateral is α∗1 = 0 if
1
2
(1 + a)u(F ∗1 ) +
1
2
(1− a)u(RL) ≥ u(F ∗2 ) (8)
or else α∗2 = F
∗
2 −RL.
Corollary 1 captures the structure that the agent wants to impose on the risk
transfer contract given that the bank chooses high action a (i.e. without consid-
ering the incentive constraint in equation (6)).
The implication of the first line in equation (7) is that the agent wants to achieve
the same level of consumption cH1 = F
∗
1 in three out of four possible states of the
world. In the fourth state of the world, where both the bank and the agent are
faced with low return (i.e. RL, θL) the consumption consists only of the low return
cL1 = RL, because the agent has chosen no collateralization. In the second line,
the agent chooses full collateralization. In this case her consumption is the same
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The interplay between this particular structure of the risk-transfer contract and
the participation, resource, and incentive constraints expressed in equations (4) to
(6) is depicted in Figure 1. The x-axis and y-axis depict the consumption in all
four different states of the world: To be able to depict all states of the world in
a two-dimensional graph, I combine on the y-axis the three states of the world,
where the agents reaches constant consumption after signing the contract cH1 = F
∗
1
or cH2 = F
∗
2 and on the x-axis I depict the fourth state of the world, where the
bank would need to pay, but has zero return and therefore only the collateral is
available for transfer, i.e. cL1 = RL or c
L
2 = RL + α
∗
2.
The two lines Pa, P
′
a, and Pb, P
′
b represent the participation constraint of the bank
conditional on action e ∈ {a, b} being chosen by the bank. The indifference curves
of the agents ua and ub have the same expected utility to make them comparable.
Point A depicts the level of utility, that the agent can achieve with the transfer
contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1 = 0〉 (no collateralization). In fact, the agent could achieve a
higher utility, if she chose a point between A and D but since she cannot charge
negative margin, αa = 0 is the best she can achieve. Point B can be reached with
the full collateralization contract 〈F ∗2 , α∗2 = F ∗2 −RL〉 but is in this example inferior
compared to no collateralization.
Note, that the bank is willing to choose action a, since choosing action b would
lead to a lower expected return for the bank (since the participation constraint
PbP
′
b lies below point A). Note also, that the two indifference curves intersect
exactly at the 45 degree line, because in this case the agent is indifferent whether
the bank chooses high or low effort. As can be shown, it is never optimal for the
agent to propose a contract which lies below the 45 degree line (i.e. since it is never
optimal for the agent to charge more collateral to make her better off in the fourth
state of the world). In addition, any consumption without collateral must lie at
the vertical line going through RL and any consumption with full collateral lies
on the 45 degree line. If continuous collateral was allowed, then solutions between
those two lines would be possible too. Finally, the agent would never suggest a
contract where F − RH > 0 (i.e. receiving a positive transfer in case of a good
state of the economy), therefore a contract must lie always below the horizontal
line intersecting RH .
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Figure 1: Utility of agents and participation constraint as well as level of effort by
banks
Whether the agent chooses no or full collateralization depends on whether equa-
tion (8) holds or not. I argue, that α∗1 = 0 is an optimal outcome for a wide range
of possible parameters. Consider the agent’s utility u(x) = −e−cx, where c is the









(1− a) ≤ e− c2(1+ra)
It can be shown, that the inequality holds, i.e. that no collateral will be called
when a is high (high likelihood that the bank will not default), with high θH (when
calling collateral is very costly due to high opportunity costs of the bank), and low
c (low risk aversion of the agent). For example, when a = .98 and θH = 1.3 then
with only a very high risk aversion of c ≥ 6.45 a contract with full collateralization
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is preferred.
This discussion leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In an exclusive contract environment there can be an equilibrium
only with high level of effort e∗ = a. As long as a is close to 1, θH high enough
or risk aversion is not too high, and the incentive constraint 2(θH − 1) ≥ 11+a is
satisfied then 〈F ∗1 , α∗1 = 0〉 (no collateralization) is the preferred contract.
When the incentive constraint would be violated without collateral, then agents
either suggest a contract with full collateralization 〈F ∗2 , α∗2 = F ∗2 − RL〉 or prefers
no contract at all. Finally, low effort e = b can never be an equilibrium in an
exclusive contract environment.
The incentive constraint 2(θH − 1) ≥ 11+a in case of a contract with no collateral
can be derived from combining equation (2) and the first line of equation (7).
When an agent prefers a fully collateralized contract, then the bank always has
an incentive to exert high effort because she earns a lower return on the invested
asset but does always have to pay the transfer because it is fully collateralized.
If an agent would prefer to have a contract with zero collateralization (i.e. U(F ∗2 , R) ≤
U(F ∗1 , R)) but needs to fully collateralize to ensure that the bank exerts high ef-
fort, the question is whether she would rather choose to have no contract at all.,
i.e. when is the following equation satisfied
U(R) ≥ U(F ∗2 , R)
Above inequality is satisfied when the agent has a very low risk aversion or the
opportunity cost of charging collateral is high. But then the agent might prefer
not to trade a contract at all, rather than charging full collateral.
Finally, the result that e = b can never be an equilibrium is intuitive: If the bank
exerts low effort, than rb = 0 which means that charging collateral carries no
opportunity costs. In this case, the agent can as well fully collateralize the trade.
In such a case, the bank has an incentive to exert high effort as shown above. Low
effort can never be an equilibrium.
As stated in the following corollary, an agent always prefers to have a contract
with no collateralization compared to no contract at all.
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Corollary 2 Given the optimal contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 the agent is always strictly better
off with the contract as long as a > 0, i.e.
U(R,F ∗1 ) > U(R) for ∀ a ∈ [0, 1) (9)
From corollary 2 it follows that if the agent is sufficiently risk averse and rather
prefers full collateralization that such an agent strictly prefers such a contract than
no contract at all.
Cenedese Gino and Vasios [2018] study derivatives prices of interest rate swaps
traded in OTC markets and find, that the swap rate decreases by posting margins
and with higher buyer’s creditworthiness. Both results are consistent with the
findings presented in this section. In addition, I provide a theory, why agents
would not ask for collateral at all, something that was empirically found in the
paper.
4 Nonexclusive Contracts
In this section, the contractual relationship between agent and bank is not consid-
ered to be exclusive any more: banks can have contractual relationships with more
than one agent. In order to illustrate the issue assume for a moment that the agent
naively observes a bank’s capital, knows the banks choices regarding its effort level
and associated costs and works out that it can propose the contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 with
no collateralization since the agent expects that the bank exerts high-level effort
e∗ = a in case of a contract with only one counterparty.
However, suppose that if the bank can sign up to N contracts. Then the incentive
constraint from proposition 1 can be expressed as N 1
1+a
≤ 2(θH − 1). Thus if the
bank signs N > N1 = b2(1 + a)(θH − 1)c10 contracts then the incentive constraint
is not met any more in which case the bank can increase her profit by exerting
effort e = b after point A in Figure 2. In addition, if the bank signs more contracts
N > N2 = b(1 + a)θHc she eventually violates the resource constraint in case of
RL, θH and her profit will increase even steeper with each additional contract after
point B.
10The floor function bxc gives the largest integer less than or equal to x.
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Figure 2: Expected profit of bank with n contracts
Interpreting the number of trading roundsN as the size of the market for contingent-
contracts I can state the following definition.
Definition 2 An nonexclusive contract equilibrium for market size N consists of
a contract 〈F, α〉 where no agent has an incentive to deviate and offer a different
contract 〈F, α〉′ .
Given market size N in equilibrium all agent need to offer the same contract and
the bank accepting up to N contracts must still be exerting the level of effort that
the contract assumes the bank would. Based on this, I can state the following
results.
Proposition 2 In case of nonexclusive contracts, two market categories can be
distinguished. In a small market where N ≤ N1 = b2(1 +a)(θH − 1)c agents are
free to propose contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 without or 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 with full collateralization. In
a big market where N > N1 full collateralization 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 is an equilibrium only
when U(R,F ∗1 ) ≤ U(R,F ∗2 ) or else there is no equilibrium.
The function of collateral in proposition 2 is different compared to proposition
1: Agents require collateral if the market is too big in order to avoid that the
counterparty signs too many contracts (or to verify that the counterparty has not
already signed too many contract). The agents do so, even if they in an exclusive
contract environment, would not require collateral at all.
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An issue arises if the agents would prefer not to charge collateral (i.e. U(R,F ∗1 ) ≤
U(R,F ∗2 )) but should in order to discipline the bank (because N > N1). In this
case an agent has an incentive to deviate and not charge collateral if all other
agents charge collateral. In such a case there can be no equilibrium.
The question is, whether (costly) collateral is the only way of avoiding banks
signing too many contracts, i.e. whether agents could not offer any other contract
that would have the bank reveal N . The short answer is no: agents always have an
incentive to miss-report the number of counterparties they have singed contracts
or plan to sign contracts with. The reason is that agents find out whether a bank
has singed too many contracts only when it is too late and the bank is in default
and therefore no punishment or incentive scheme is feasible.
The issue becomes more complicated, if one is willing to relax the assumption
that the number of signed contracts are private information to the bank only. In
the following chapter I discuss one such framework, where a rating agency can
determine with some level of probability, whether the bank has singed too many
contracts or not and send a good or bad signal.11
5 Termination Clause
5.1 Extension of the trading game
The trading game is the same as described in chapter 2. In addition, at the end
of N trading rounds and after the bank has exhibited effort e = {a, b} a rating
agency evaluates each bank and sends a signal s ∈ {sg, sb}. The rating agency
sends a good signal sg if he thinks that the number of counterparties the bank is
contracting with is below a critical threshold n∗ and a bad signal sb if he thinks it
11Another possible framework which the author has studied but chosen not to present in this
paper is to allow the agent to reliably verify the number of contracts a bank has singedg at the
end of period 1. The agent can punish a bank if it has signed too many contracts when the state
of the economy is good by reducing the transfer amount it was supposed to pay to the bank (or
even impose a fine on the bank). At the end, this framework suffers from the same shortcomings
as the first one: It extends the size of the market where no collateral must be charged, but at
some market size N full collateralization cannot be avoided. Interestingly, the author is not
aware of any contractual arrangement that contains such a clause. The reason might be, that it
is not possible or simple to determine whether a counterparty has signed too many contracts in
a good state of the economy.
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is above. Conditional probability of a signal is:
λ = prob[sg | n ≤ n∗] = prob[sb | n > n∗]
Given that a bank has received a bad signal sb agents that have signed a contract
with a termination clause can terminate the contract with the bank and in a final
round propose a contract to another bank that has received a good signal sg.
5.2 Maximization problem and results
The critical level of contracts is defined as n∗ = N1 i.e. where the incentive
constraint is just met. Given that the agent can credibly threat to terminate the
contract in case of a bad signal sb but will continue with the contract in case the
signal is good sg and given that the agent proposes contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 a bank will
keep it’s number of counterparties at or below the threshold n∗ as long as
λ[π(n∗, F ∗1 , α
∗
1, a)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
sg




+ (1− λ)[π(N,F ∗1 , α∗1, b)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
sg
In the first and second term the bank keeps the number of contracts at the critical
level n∗ which means that she exerts a high effort and is able to pay all transfers
(except in case RL, θL where she defaults). In the first term the rating agency
sends a good signal and the agents do not terminate the contracts. In the second
term the rating agency falsely sends a bad signal and all agents terminate the
contract. Since the bank exerted high effort and invested all capital her profits are
not affected by the termination.12
In the third and fourth term the bank contracts with the maximum possible num-
ber N of counterparties, exerts low effort b and is not able to fulfill her contractual
obligations in case of (RL, θL) as well as (RL, θH). In the third term, the rating
agency uncovers this and sends a bad signal sb so that all agents terminate the
contract and the bank is left with one unit of capital. In the fourth and last term
the rating agency falsely sends a good signal sg so that the bank can make a pos-
12However note, that the early termination clause is only for free when α∗1 = 0. If that is not
the case, then ”false” early termination carries opportunity costs α∗1ra which would need to be
compensated by the principle from the beginning.
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The equation can be simplified by noting that the left-hand side is the expected
profit of the bank and given a binding participation constraint equals π(0, 0, a) =







. Entering equation (7) for F ∗1 − RH
the termination clause ensures that the bank keeps the number of contracts at n∗











Clearly, the maximal market size crucially depends on λ which stands for the accu-
racy of the rating agency. If λ is high, then the maximal market size where agents
can trade first-best contracts can increase manifolds compared to the situation
where no termination clause is present in the state contingent contract.
Is the threat from the agent to terminate the contract credible? Consider this: if
the inequality in equation (10) holds than no bank will overextend and sign too
many contracts. In such a case, if a rating agency sends a bad signal, then agents
should assume that it is a false signal and ignore it (i.e. not terminate the con-
tract), so the threat is not credible. However, if all agents act in this way, then the
bank can safely overextend since no agent will terminate in case of a bad signal.
The only way out is if the agent has a free outside option i.e. the ability to sign
a new similar contract with another bank who received a good signal. Then it is
a weakly dominant strategy to terminate a contract in case of a bad signal, even
when all banks have an incentive to behave good.
Finally, a termination clause is not useful (or will not be exercised) in case of full
collateralization.
Proposition 3 A termination clause extends the market size where the contract
13The expected profit is based on the profit multiplied with the probability. I can differentiate
the following four cases where in the last two cases the profit is zero. Note too, that bθH = 1.
bp θH −N(F ∗1 −RH) ≥ 0
(1− b)p −N(F ∗1 −RH) ≥ 0
b(1− p) 0
(1− b)(1− p) 0
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ba(θH−1)c ≥ 1. The inequality holds even when 1 − λ = .5, i.e. when
the rating agency has a very bad track record of picking banks with too many
contracts.14
It is worth noting, that parties who enter into OTC derivatives very often use
the ISDA Master Agreement (or some adapted domestic version) which is a docu-
ment published by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) to
provide certain legal and credit protection. Besides offering the benefit of standard-
ization of contractual arrangement, the ISDA Master Agreement together with its
annexes defines the provision of collateral and the early termination of the con-
tract.15 As has been shown here, such termination clauses can have a disciplining
effect on the counterparties under certain circumstances.
6 Central Counterparty Clearing
In the CCP clearing economy I will first consider the case where there is only one
CCP that clears all trades, i.e. the contracts are still non-exclusive but there is an
agency (the CCP) which keeps track of the contracts signed by a single bank. In
the next chapter I will extend the analysis by allowing agents and banks to clear
at the CCP or bilaterally and by allowing two CCPs to be active in the market.
The trading game in the CCP clearing economy is the same as described in chapter
2 with a few adjustments. When submitting trades for CCP clearing, the agents
can propose the swap-rate F only. Because it is the CCP that defines and collects
from the bank the collateral αCCPē which must be sufficient to cover any potential
shortfall if the bank or any other bank defaults given the economy-wide level of
effort ē.16 In addition, the CCP limits the number of contracts n that it allows
14To see this the ratio can be simplified for 1 − λ = .5 to 2ra + .5 ≤ a(θH − 1). After some
reformulations I get (θa − 1.5)(θH − 1) + .5 ≥ 0 which is always satisfied for a > 0.
15See https://www.isda.org for an overview of the ISDA Master Agreement and Maizar et al.
[2010] for the description of the Credit Support Annex to define the provision of collateral.
16αCCPē has characteristics of a default fund contribution (mutualization of risks) as well as
initial margin (calculated for each trade).
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each bank to submit for clearing. Finally, the bank decides based on that which
level of effort e she wants to exhibit. In equilibrium e must equal ē.
In the following I will consider the equilibrium with and without termination clause
applied by the agents.
6.1 No termination clause: Maximization problem and equi-
librium
Given an economy-wide default-rate of 1 − ē the CCP knows that a share of ē
banks will have a return θH and the other share 1− ē will have a return of θL = 0
and default on their obligations in case of a bad state of the economy RL. The
collateral - or as I will call it from now on - the default fund contribution of each
bank is thus by definition αCCPē = (1− ē)τL. Given that each bank signs n transfer
contracts τR and contributes α
CCP
ē to the default fund for each contract, the bank
chooses the optimal action e ∈ {a, b} to maximize
π(n, F, αCCPē , e) =
1
2




The first term in equation (11) reflects the fact that the bank can expect to receive
her contribution to the default fund only in a good state of the economy with
probability 1
2
. The second term expresses the return that is expected over the
investment (1 − nαCCPē ) minus dis-utility. The third term states the expected
profit of the bank writing n identical contracts. The bank will always receive the
transfer τH whenever the economy is in a good state but in case of a bad state
of the economy, she will need to pay the transfer τL only when she has sufficient
funds (i.e. with likelihood 1
2
e) in case her return on the asset is zero the transfer
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will be paid by the default fund.17
The corresponding incentive constraint (i.e. the condition to ensure that the bank
prefers to exhibit high effort e = a) can be expressed as:
1
2
nτ(RL) ≤ (1− nαCCPē )(θH − 1) (12)
An agent proposes payment F where τR = F −R to maximize her utility:
U(R,F ) (13)
subject to
π(F, αCCPē , e) ≥ π(0, 0, a) (14)
Note that the agent does not need to consider the resource, the incentive constraint,
or the number of contracts n the bank has or will sign since the CCP guarantees all
contracts. The agent will however still need to consider the participation constraint
and compensate the bank for opportunity costs of the default-contribution and
probability of losing it.
Definition 3 A CCP clearing equilibrium is an array 〈n, τ, αCCPē , e∗〉 such that
e∗ maximize (11) given 〈n, τ, αCCPē 〉, τ maximize (13) given αCCPē subject to (16),
and ē = e∗.
The solution to the agent’s maximization problem is simple: she wants to receive
the highest possible fixed payment F where the participation constraint is exactly
met. This gives rise to the following results.





nαCCPe + (1− nαCCPē )θH − nτH ≥ 0
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Proposition 4 A CCP clearing equilibrium exists with ē = a in case of n ≤
NCCPa = b2 1−(1−a)ra1
2
+(1−a)(θH−1)(θH − 1)c and ē = b for N
CCP
a < n ≤ NCCPb = b 2θH(1−ra)c




(RH +RL)− αCCPa ra =
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Given that FCCPa − FCCPb = ra(a+(1−a)ra)2(1+(1−a)ra) > 0 it is clear that all agents are better
off, when the CCP sets the limit n ≤ NCCP1 to ensures that the bank exerts high
effort e = a.
6.2 Termination clause: Maximization problem and equi-
librium
In what follows, I will adjust the maximization problem described above for the
case where a CCP uses a termination clause. To ensure that the bank exerts high
effort e = a, the incentive constraint in equation (12) must be rewritten as follows:
(1− λ)π(n∗, F, αCCPā,T , a) + λπ(0, 0, αCCPā,T , a) ≥ (1− λ)π(N,F, αCCPā,T , b) + λ (15)
On the left-hand side the bank keeps the number of contracts at the critical level
n∗, i.e. exerts a high effort. In the first term the rating agency sends (correctly)
a good signal and the bank can keeps the negotiated contract (see profit in equa-
tion (11)). In the second term, the rating agency (wrongly) sends a bad signal
and the CCP cancels the contract of the bank, in which case π(0, 0, αCCPā,T , a) =
nαCCPa,T + (1− nαCCPa,T )(θH − Ca).
On the right-hand side the bank contracts with the maximum number N of coun-
terparties and exerts low level of effort b. In the third term the rating agency falsely




(1−N(FCCPa,T −RH)).18 In the fourth and last term, the rating agency uncovers
that the bank signed too many contracts and the CCP terminates all immediately.
Finally, an agent proposes payment F to maximize her utility as shown in equation
(13) subject to
(1− λ)π(n, F, αCCPā,T , a) + λπ(0, 0, αCCPā,T , a) ≥ π(0, 0, a) (16)
The solution to the agent’s maximization problem is simple: she wants to receive
the highest possible fixed payment F where the participation constraint is exactly
met. This gives rise to the following results.
Proposition 5 A CCP clearing equilibrium with termination clause exists with





)c with the following swap rate:
FCCPa,T =
1









2 + 2(1− a)ra
+RL
Given that FCCPa − FCCPa,T = 1−λλ αCCPa,T ra > 0 it is clear that implementing the
termination clause comes at a cost for the agent.
7 Bilateral and CCP Clearing
In this section I extend the analysis by giving the agents the choice to clear the
contract bilaterally with a bank or via a CCP. I will consider situations where there
is one or two CCPs available. Before I define the clearing equilibrium I summarize
and simplify the results obtained so far.
18The expected profit is based on the profit multiplied with the probability. I can differentiate
the following four cases where in the last two cases the profit is zero. Note too, that bθH = 1.
.5b NαCCPa,T + (1−NαCCPa,T )θH −N(FCCPa,T −RH) ≥ 0




Table 1: Summary of incentive compatible swap rates and critical market size







+RL N1 = b2(1 + a)(θH − 1)c N1 = 1
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CCP, e = b FCCPb =
1
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The approximation is based on the assumption, that a is close to one, the return θH is
in the range of 1.25 ≥ θH < 1.5, and that λ ≥ 0.5. If several values are possible, then
the lowest is picked.
As can be derived from Table 1 the swap rates can be ranked in the following






b , i.e. a bilateral contract with no collateral
pays the highest swap rate, followed by a CCP-cleared contract where the bank
exerts high effort. A bilateral fully collateralized contract has a lower swap rate
still. Finally, the swap rate cleared at a CCP where banks exert low effort is the
lowest. The ranking of FCCPa,T depends on the conditional probability λ.
19 In the
following I will assume, that λ is sufficiently high but below one to ensure that
















The ranking of swap-rates cannot be translated one-to-one into utility ranking
in all cases. The following general statements can be made: U(R,FCCPa ) >
U(R,FCCPa,T ) > U(R,F
∗
2 ) > U(R,F
CCP
b ) because in all four cases, the payment
of the swap rate is guaranteed and the ranking follows directly from the size of the
swap rate. The ranking of the utility of the contract with no collateral U(R,F ∗1 )
depends on the risk-aversion of the agent c, the return of the risky asset θH , and
the default rate 1− a as will be shown in the discussion that follows.
The ranking of the critical market size is as follows: N1 ≤ NCCPa ≤ NCCPa,T ≤ NT ≤
NCCPb . The critical market size refers to the number of contracts a bank can sign
at most without violating the incentive constraint (i.e. to ensure that e = a) or
the resource constraint (i.e. in order to ensure that the bank can pay when her
returns are high).
Finally, the approximation in the last column in table 1 is based on the assump-
tion, that a is close to one, the return θH is in the range of 1.25 ≥ θH < 1.5, and
that λ ≥ 0.5. More concretely, I have that N1 = NCCPa < NCCPa,T = NT = NCCPb .
These are the values that I will use in the following discussion of clearing equilib-
rium.
When discussing an equilibrium, I will use the following definition.
Definition 4 A clearing equilibrium for market size N where agents can clear
bilaterally or through one CCP is an incentive compatible contract 〈F, α〉 where no
agent has an incentive to deviate and offer a different bilateral contract 〈F, α〉′.
In case of two CCPs the agent has additionally no incentive to deviate and clear
at the other CCP.
Before starting the analysis I need to clarify what an incentive compatible contract
〈F, α〉 is and how an agent can deviate. First, incentive compatible contract means
that the bank has an incentive to accept the contract (participation constraint),
that the bank exerts the expected level of effort e ∈ a, b and that the expected
transfers τR = F − R are subject to the resource constraint. In this sense table 1
sums up all such contracts given that the banks does not sign more contracts than
specified by the critical market size. Therefore, when discussing an equilibrium I
need to check whether the bank has an incentive and the possibility to sign more
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contracts.
Second, in case of one CCP the agent can only deviate by proposing another bilat-
eral clearing contract. To understand this, consider the following two situations.
Given all agents clear with a CCP under a certain contract then an agent can
only deviate by proposing to clear bilaterally with a contract of her choice. The
agent cannot propose another CCP contract because the CCP sets the margins
and therefore indirectly defines the contract. However, if all agents clear bilater-
ally, then an agent cannot deviate by proposing to clear through a CCP (even if
a CCP were available in the background) because if only one agent clears with a
CCP then there is no diversification advantage. In such a situation the agent can
only deviate by proposing another bilateral contract. Therefore, when discussing
an equilibrium I need to check whether an agent is better off by suggesting another
incentive compatible bilateral clearing contract.
Finally, 〈FCCPb , αCCPb 〉 can never be an equilibrium because an agent can always
deviate by proposing 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 and be better off. All agents weakly prefer 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉
with a termination clause compared to the same contract without a termination
clause. I will thus only consider in the analysis the following set of four contracts:
〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 (with termination clause), 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉, 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉, and 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉.
I will start with the analysis of the situation where the agent can choose between
clearing a trade bilateral or through one CCP and then proceed to analyze the
situation where two CCPs compete. All results are summarized in table (2).
7.1 Bilateral clearing and one CCP
For a market size N > NT = 2 the threat of contract termination does not deter
the agent from signing too many contracts and so the contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 cannot be
part of the equilibrium, i.e. there are three equilibrium candidates that I need to
consider: It is in case of bilateral clearing full collateralization 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 as well as
the two CCP Clearing contracts 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉 and 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉.
Consider first 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉 which would provide the highest utility of the remain-
ing possible contracts (i.e. incentive or resource constraint compatible) for the
agents. It is only then an equilibrium, when no agent has an incentive to deviate.
Given that all other agents clear with the CCP, then an agent who prefers bilateral
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clearing with a termination clause (and zero collateral) compared to CCP clear-
ing (U(R,FCCPa ) < U(R,F
∗
1 )) has an incentive to deviate. This strategy works
because the bank that the bilaterally clearing agent signs a contract with will not
accept a second contract cleared by a CCP because she does not want to risk
receiving a downgrade by the rating agency. However, if all agents deviate and
sign a bilateral contract with a termination clause then the bank has an incentive
to sign too many contracts. Therefore 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉 is only an equilibrium when
U(R,FCCPa ) ≥ U(R,F ∗1 ) which ensures that no agents wants to deviate.
The contract 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉 is an equilibrium even if agents would prefer the bi-
lateral contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉. Given that all agent use a CCP with this particular
contract then no agent has an incentive to deviate and offer a bilateral contract
〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 because the termination clause is ineffective in case of NCCPa,T = NT . In
other words, if a CCP allows the bank to sign NCCPa,T contracts then deviating
and offering a bilateral contract is not incentive compatible since the bank has an
incentive to deviate and exert low effort.
Finally, the full collateralization 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 is only a possible equilibrium when
U(R,F ∗2 ) ≥ U(R,F ∗1 ), i.e. when agents are sufficiently risk averse or the return
θH is not too high. The reason is, that if all agents propose 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 then an agent
prefers to deviate if U(R,F ∗2 ) ≤ U(R,F ∗1 ) and offer 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 instead. This strategy
is incentive compatible, because the bank still has an incentive to exert high effort
a.
For market size N ≤ NT = 2 two changes occur. First, the contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉
with termination clause is now an equilibrium in case where U(R,F ∗2 ) < U(R,F
∗
1 ).
Second, the range for contract 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉 where it is an equilibrium narrows:
it is only then a possible equilibrium when U(R,FCCPa,T ) ≥ U(R,F ∗1 ). The reason
is that the agent can deviate and offer a bilateral clearing contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 if he is
better off without having to fear that the bank will sign too many contracts and
exert low effort b.
Finally, which of those four equilibria provide highest utility for the agents? In case
of low risk aversion c, or high return on the risky asset θH the agent rather prefers
to trade a contract bilaterally without collateral, instead of choosing a CCP, i.e.
U(R,FCCPa ) < U(R,F
∗
1 ). In this case the equilibrium with highest utility for the
agent is 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉. If the risk aversion of the agent c is high or the return of the
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bank θH is not too high then the agents prefers to choose the CCP instead of
the bilateral contracts, i.e. U(R,FCCPa ) > U(R,F
∗
1 ). In such a case the equilib-
rium with highest utility for the agents is 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉. Thus 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉 and
〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 are possible but never the preferable equilibria.
Proposition 6 When agents can choose to clear either bilaterally or with one
CCP then 〈FCCPb , αCCPb 〉 cannot be an equilibrium. In case of N ≤ NT all other
bilateral or CCP equilibria are possible. When the market size is N > NT then the
bilateral clearing contract without collateral 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 is not an equilibrium (but the
remaining three are). In all cases e = a.
7.2 Bilateral clearing and two CCPs
I will now analyze the situation with two CCPs. First, note that if there are two
CCPs offering the same contract than each can set a limit of n = 1 only. Setting
a limit of n = 2 does not work because then in aggregate a bank could clear at
both CCPs, exhaust their resources in case of a bad state of the economy RL, so
there would not be sufficient capital around to finance the transfers.20
Second, note that no CCP will choose to use the termination clause. This is be-
cause the termination clause is expensive and has positive externalities. To see
this, suppose two CCPs share the market, both set the limit n = 1 and both use
the termination clause. This would be sufficient to ensure that all bank exert high
effort e = a and choose to clear only at one CCP. However, one CCP has an incen-
tive to deviate and not apply the termination clause but still keep the limit n = 1.
In this case all agents would choose this CCP and the other CCP who applies the
termination clause will never be chosen. This is equivalent to the case of having
one CCP only in the market as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, the
second CCP has an incentive not to apply the termination clause too. But then
the banks will have an incentive to clear at both CCPs and thus exert low effort
and so ē = b with the swap rate FCCPb .
I start first with the market size being N ≤ N1 = 1. In this case, the solution
is simple: agents can choose either to clear bilaterally or through a CCP. All
20Because the resource constraint in case of θH , RL would be violated: (1 − 4αCCPa )θH −
4(FCCPa −RL)) < 0.
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four equilibria 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 (with termination clause), 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉, 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉, and
〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉 are possible depending on the agent’s risk aversion or size of risky
return θH (see discussion in section 7.1).
In case of a market size N1 < N ≤ NT = 2 it can be shown, that agents prefer
to clear bilaterally using the termination clause and zero collateral or full collat-
eralization (depending on the agent’s risk aversion). CCP clearing cannot be an
equilibrium because if all clear at the CCPs then as shown above, the CCPs will
not apply a termination clause and end up in an equilibrium where ē = b in which
case an agent has always an incentive to deviate and bilaterally clear with full
collateralization because U(R,F ∗2 ) > U(R,F
CCP
b ).
If the market size grows to N > NT = 2 then bilateral clearing with full collater-
alization 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 is the two possible equilibrium.
Proposition 7 When agents can choose to clear either bilaterally or with one of
two CCPs then in case of N ≤ N1 agents will either clear bilaterally with the
optimal contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 and a termination clause or use the CCP to clear the
optimal contract 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉. In both cases e = a.
In case of N1 < N ≤ NT all agents will either prefer 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉 or 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉.
When the market size is N > NT and then there is only one equilibrium 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉.
Table 2: Possible Clearing Equilibria
N ≤ N1 N ≤ NT = 2 N > NT = 2
One CCP 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉, 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉, 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉,
〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉,
〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉, 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉 〈FCCPa,T , αCCPa,T 〉
Two CCPs same as above 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉,〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉 〈F ∗2 , α∗2〉
7.3 Implications
The main results of the discussion above can be summarized as follows. The con-
tracts 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉 or 〈F ∗1 , α∗a〉 offer the highest utility for the agents. Which of
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those two carries the highest utility depends on the risk aversion and the size of the
risky return θH (or alternatively the opportunity cost of collateral). Agents with
low risk aversion facing banks with high returns on the risky asset rather prefer to
clear bilaterally without collateral 〈F ∗1 , α∗1〉. Agents with high risk aversion facing
banks with low risky returns rather prefer to clear with the CCP 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉
without a termination contract.
These two contracts, however, do not always form an equilibrium for two reasons.
The first reason is competition between CCPs. In case of two CCPs offering clering
for the same market the clearing contract 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉 cannot be an equilibrium
because banks can clear contracts at different CCPs and so circumvent the limits
that CCPs might set.
The second reason is market size. For big markets 〈F ∗1 , α∗a〉 does not work because
banks would sign too many contracts unchecked and so 〈FCCPa , αCCPa 〉 remains as
the only viable alternative in case there is no competition between CCPs. How-
ever, agents have an incentive to deviate, not use the CCP and clear bilaterally
(without collateral) instead.
In a sense, CCPs have tried to solve this issue by effectively imposing mandatory
clearing for certain liquid (and thus big) markets and allowing only one CCP to
do the clearing, i.e. it is not possible to trade in a derivative market without
using the dedicated CCP which in many cases is an integral part of the exchange
market. For example, LCH launched in 1999 a CCP for interest rate swaps (IRS)
with wide support from global banks, covering by the end of 2006 around 40% of
the global inter-dealer IRS market (CPSS [2007]). However, this strategy might
not work for contracts that are traded at many marketplaces globally where it
is difficult to impose de-facto mandatory clearing or where competition between
CCPs in different jurisdictions is allowing the banks to distribute their contracts.
Another reason where self-organized mandatory clearing with one CCP is difficult
to impose is in markets which have grown from small to a big in a relatively short
time frame. In such cases the market participants might not react quickly enough
and establish market practices or even set up a CCP taking into account the grow-
ing importance and market size. This has arguably happened in the credit-default
rate market which has seen an almost tenfold increase between 2004 to 2007 where
it roughly peaked at USD 67, 2 trillion at end-2007.
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As described above, in such cases it can be argued that regulation of margin re-
quirements in bilateral as well as CCP cleared markets can help to overcome the
coordination problem. However, imposing mandatory clearing or collateral require-
ments in markets that are small reduces the utility of the market participants. In
addition, CCPs would need to charge more collateral than is required to guarantee
a default-free contract. From an financial stability point of view that might be an
acceptable outcome because in practice it is difficult to establish which markets
are small and which one are big. In addition, the size of the markets might change
fast, making regulatory adjustments necessary over time.
8 Concluding remarks
In this paper, I study derivatives markets where risk-averse agents have the choice
to trade contracts with risk-neutral banks through a central counterparty (CCP),
where the level of collateral is set by the CCP, or clear them bilaterally where the
level of collateral can be negotiated. An important feature of the model is that
without collateral, the agents cannot control the size of the positions taken by the
bank. As a result the bank might find it profitable to trade too many contracts,
exert low levels of effort and subsequently default on her obligations.
I show that collateral discourages banks from trading too many contracts, encour-
ages the bank to exert high levels of effort, and ensures that the obligations are
always met. But collateral exhibits positive externalities and is costly, therefore
even risk-averse agents would prefer not to use it. I show that contractual inno-
vations (e.g. termination clauses) cannot solve the moral hazard issue and mimic
the function of collateral satisfactorily. Regulation requiring agents to exchange
minimum levels of collateral help to overcome this problem.
I show that a single CCP deals with the moral hazard problem by setting position
limits. By pooling risks the CCP can offer a default-free contract at lower lev-
els of collateral compared to bilateral clearing and thus ensure that agents prefer
to use the CCP. However, position limits of a CCP do not work when she com-
petes with other CCPs for the same market. Again, regulatory minimum collateral
requirements help to overcome the moral hazard problem.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1
To solve the agent’s maximization problem given action e = a by the bank I need to
consider the participation and resource constraint in equations (3) and (4). Considering
the (binding) participation constraint I can write:











(F −RH) + a(F −RL)
)
= 0
For α = 0 the above equation can be rewritten F ∗1 =
1
1+a + RL. For α = F
∗
2 − RL the




The resource constraint needs to be considered in case of θH , RL only to ensure that the
bank can make a transfer when her return is high, which boils down to (F ∗1 −RL) ≤ θH
or just 11+a ≤ θH , which is always satisfied given the range of values I assume for a and
θH .




(1 + a)u(F ∗1 ) +
1
2
(1− a)u(RL) ≥ u(F ∗2 )
If the above inequality is not satisfied then the agent will choose full collateral.
Proof of Corollary 2
I will show that the agent is always better off with an optimal contract 〈F ∗1 , α∗1 = 0〉
than no contract at all, i.e. U(R,F ∗1 ) > U(R) for all a ∈ (0, 1]. The inequality can be












After multiplying the equation with ecRL and some further reformulation I get:
−(1 + a)e− c1+a + a > −e−c
Now it can be shown, that in case of a = 0 the agent is equally well of with or without
the contract i.e. −e−c = −e−c and that taking the derivative w.r.t. c of the difference
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−(1 + a)e− c1+a + a+ e−c equals
∂·
∂a








Which proofs that increasing a always increases the utility of the agent with the contract
and so the inequality is valid for any a > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Given that each bank signs the maximum allowed n = nCCP contracts, all agents will
propose to a bank a contract they will accept. The (binding) participation constraint
from equation (16) for any e ∈ {a, b} can be written as:
nαCCPe − n(1− p)αCCPe︸ ︷︷ ︸
=npαCCPe









e (FCCPe −RL)︸ ︷︷ ︸
τL
] = 1 + ra︸ ︷︷ ︸
θHa−Ca
After some reformulations I get FCCPe =
1












Note that both n as well as αCCPe are exogenous.
Proof of Proposition 5














nαCCPa,T − (1− nαCCPa,T )(1 + ra)
]
= 1 + ra
After some reformulations I get Fa =
1
2(RH +RL)− αCCPa,T ra − 1−λλ αCCPa,T ra
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Proof of Proposition 6
I want to show that for certain parameters U(R,FCCPa ) ≥ U(R,F ∗1 , α∗1 = 0), even if
termination clause is sufficient to ensure that e = a (i.e. when N ≤ NT ). To do so, I
will use the utility u(x) = −e−cx. Each expected utility can be expressed as
U(R,F ∗1 ) = (1−
1
2




U(R,FCCPa ) = u(F
CCP
a )
So that the above inequality can be written as.
−e−
c
2+2(1−a)ra ≥ −(1− 1
2







1+a ≤ 1 + 1
2
(1− a)(e c1+a − 1)
c(1 + 2ra)
(1 + a)(1 + (1− a)ra)
≤ e c1+a − 1
A decrease in θH (which reduces ra) or an increase of risk aversion c makes CCP clearing
more attractive.
Second, I want to show that for N > NT , i.e. when in a bilateral market full collater-
alization is necessary to ensure e = a, the agent always prefers CCP clearing. In other
words, I want to show that U(R,FCCPa ) > U(R,F
∗






F ∗2 − FCCPa = 12( 11+ra −
1
1+ra−ara ) < 0.
Thus, if all other agents clear with a CCP with clearing limit n = 1, then an agent who
prefers bilateral clearing will propose a
Proof of Proposition 7
Agent prefers bilateral clearing if full collateralization necessary com-
pared to two CCPs and (ē = b)
F bCCP =
1
2∆R− 12ra +RL, and in case of full collateralization Fa = 12(1+ra)∆R+RL, so
that










Which means, that full collateralization in a bilateral market is better than low effort in
CCP clearing.
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Agents prefer bilateral clearing if e = a but ē = b (proof)
I want to show that U(R,F bCCP ) ≤ U(R,Fa, α∗a = 0), where F bCCP = 12∆R − 12ra + RL
since n = 2 (important! Here I assume that the bank clears at both CCPs) and where
Fa − F bCCP = 1−a2(1+a)∆R+ 12ra:
−e−F bCCP ≤ −(1 + ra)e−Fa
eFa−F
b










which can be satisfied.
37
References
R. Angelo, P. Schaffner, and M. Vasios. Regulatory effects on short-term interest
rates. Bank of England Staff Working Paper, 801, 2019.
N. Arora, P. Gandhi, and F. A. Longstaff. Counterparty credit risk and the
credit default swap market. Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2):280 – 293,
2012. ISSN 0304-405X. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.001. URL
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X11002327.
B. Biais, F. Heider, and M. Hoerova. Risk-sharing or risk-taking? coun-
terparty risk, incentives, and margins. The Journal of Finance, 71(4):
1669–1698, 2016. ISSN 1540-6261. doi: 10.1111/jofi.12396. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12396.
V. Bignon and G. Vuillemey. The failure of a clearinghouse:empirical
evidence. Working papers 638, Banque de France, 2017. URL
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bfr/banfra/638.html.
A. Bisin and D. Guaitoli. Moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts. The
RAND Journal of Economics, 35(2):306–328, 2004. ISSN 07416261. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1593693.
D. S. Bizer and P. M. DeMarzo. Sequential banking. Journal of Po-
litical Economy, 100(1):41–61, 1992. ISSN 00223808, 1537534X. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138805.
A. R. Cenedese Gino and M. Vasios. Otc premia. Bank of England Staff Working
Paper, (751), Aug. 2018.
R. Cont and T. Kokholm. Central clearing of otc derivatives: Bilateral
vs multilateral netting. Statistics & Risk Modeling, 31:3–22, 2014. doi:
https://doi.org/10.1515/strm-2013-1161.
CPSS. New developments in clearing and settlement arrangements for otc deriva-
tives. Technical report, Bank for International Settlements, Mar. 2007.
38
D. Duffie and H. Zhu. Does a central clearing counterparty reduce counterparty
risk? The Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 1(1):74–95, 2011. doi: 10.1093/rap-
stu/rar001. URL + http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rapstu/rar001.
FSB-BIS-CPMI-IOSCO. Incentives to centrally clear over-the-counter (otc) deriva-
tives. Technical report, Financial Stability Board, Aug. 2018.
W. Huang. Central counterparty capitalization and misaligned incentives. BIS
Working Papers 767, Bank for International Settlements, Feb. 2019. URL
https://ideas.repec.org/p/bis/biswps/767.html.
Y. Leitner. Inducing agents to report hidden trades: A theory of an intermediary*.
Review of Finance, 16(4):1013–1042, 2012. doi: 10.1093/rof/rfr017. URL +
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfr017.
O. Lewandowska. Otc clearing arrangements for bank systemic risk regula-
tion: A simulation approach. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 47
(6):1177–1203, 2015. ISSN 1538-4616. doi: 10.1111/jmcb.12241. URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.12241.
M. Maizar, M. Jaquet, and T. Spillmann. Credit and counterparty risk: Why
trade under an isda with a csa? Schweizerische Zeitschrift fuer Gesellschafts-
und Kapitalmarktrecht sowie Umstrukturierungen, (1):63–71, 2010.
T. Santos and J. A. Scheinkman. Competition among Ex-
changes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3):1027–1061, 08
2001a. ISSN 0033-5533. doi: 10.1162/00335530152466304. URL
https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466304.
T. Santos and J. A. Scheinkman. Financial intermedia-
tion without exclusivity. American Economic Review, 91
(2):436–439, May 2001b. doi: 10.1257/aer.91.2.436. URL
https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.91.2.436.
G. Vuillemey. The value of central clearing. The Journal
of Finance, n/a(n/a), 2020. doi: 10.1111/jofi.12902. URL
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jofi.12902.
39

